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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5569
The main goal of this paper is to characterize the 
determinants of sudden stops caused by domestic vis-
à-vis foreign residents. Are the decisions of domestic 
investors to invest abroad or of foreign investors to cut off 
funds from the domestic economy governed by the same 
set of determinants? Given the distribution of different 
types of sudden stop episodes over time and its different 
macroeconomic consequences, the authors argue that 
the determinants may not be alike. Using an effective 
sample of 82 countries with annual information over the 
period 1970–2007, the analysis finds that global investors 
are less likely to stop bringing their capital when their 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at ccalderon@worldbank.org.  
economy is growing and the world interest rate is lower. 
Domestic agents are more willing to invest abroad if the 
macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy 
is poor (high inflation), the financial system is weak, 
and there are high external savings (current account 
surpluses). Increasing financial openness makes the 
domestic country more vulnerable to sudden stops caused 
by either local or global investors. Finally, countries with 
higher shares of foreign direct investment are less prone 
to inflow-driven sudden stops, whereas the opposite holds 
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The paths of development, growth and crisis among developing countries have been tightly 
related to patterns of abundance and scarcity in foreign financing. Sudden stops in capital flows 
tend to trigger or occur around crisis episodes and were more likely to happen in the 1990s 
than  in  the  1980s  (see  Cavallo  and  Frankel,  2008),  with  deleterious  effects  on  economic 
performance (Becker and Mauro, 2006; Cerra and Saxena, 2009). This phenomenon of sudden 
stops in capital flows, however, can be driven by the behavior of either global or local investors. 
When  driven  by  a  sharp  decline  in  gross  inflows,  sudden  stop  episodes  may  render  the 
domestic economy vulnerable to the decisions of foreign investors. In contrast, when sudden 
stops  are  largely  attributed  to  sharp  increases  in  gross  outflows,  they  are  not  necessarily 
consistent with the view that the domestic country is being cut off from international financial 
markets.  These  episodes  may  be  related  to  local  investors  switching  to  larger  positions  in 
foreign securities. If so, then this distinction may play a crucial role in assessing the effects of 
sudden stops on economic performance and their policy implications. Therefore, it is crucial for 
policymakers to identify the relative importance of the shocks underlying sudden stops. If a 
certain type of sudden stop is mainly attributed to declining gross inflows by foreigners, the 
central policy implication is to reduce the vulnerability of the domestic economy to external 
financial shocks (i.e. country insurance). The policy recommendation would be different if the 
reversal in net flows is driven by gross outflows of local residents which, in turn, are usually 
triggered by policy mismanagement (or better risk-taking opportunities abroad).  
 
The empirical literature has typically identified sudden stops as episodes where net reversals of 
capital flows take place (Calvo et al. 2004). However, as we argued above, the observed decline 
in the financial account could be driven by decisions of either foreign investors (where foreign 
capital ceases to flow into the domestic economy) or local investors (where there are sudden 
increases in investors’ international investments). Indeed, a non-trivial number of sudden stop 
episodes do not appear to be driven by the interruption of flows to the domestic economy from 
global investors, but arise due to sharp increases in gross capital outflows (Rothenberg and 
Warnock, 2006; Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco and Neilson, 2008).
1 If a decline in financial account 
is explained by rising gross outflows (rather than a decrease in gross inflows), we are unable to 
characterize the domestic country as being cut off from the international financial markets. In 
this context, Cowan and De Gregorio (2005) and Fau cette, Rothenberg and Warnock (2005) 
argued that the sudden-stop behavior observed in Chile during the period 1998-99 was mainly 
driven by a large increase in the position of Chilean residents in foreign equities, bonds and 
foreign bank deposits. Chile was not cut off from international markets, but it was affected by a 
sudden desire of local residents to accumulate and diversify their portfolios in foreign assets.  
 
Although net capital flows are an important concept, we currently live in a world of substantial 
“two-way” gross capital flows (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). The concept of gross inflows by 
foreigners  and  gross  outflows  by  domestic  residents  is  essential  in  advanced  countries. 
                                                 
1 Frankel and Schmukler (1996) find that local investors rather than foreign ones are the first to flee the countries 
in the run up to the 1994-95 Mexican sudden stop. 3 
 
Moreover, this concept has become increasingly significant in emerging markets due to reserve 
accumulation and current account surpluses.
2 Focusing our analysis solely on net capital flows 
may neglect significant nuances of the data on gross flows, thus leading to misinterpretations of 
the empirical evidence. Therefore, the data on gross capital flows will enable us to distinguish 
between  episodes  in  which  foreign  investors  cut  the  access  of  emerging  markets  to 
international markets vis-à-vis those episodes in which domestic residents pull their funds out 
of the country. 
 
The numerous phases of euphoria and drought in external financing for developing countries 
have led to polarizing views on the benefits of capital flows.
3 One strand of the literature argues 
that capital flows may propel  economic growth and development through different channels: 
(a) a wider access to foreign capital may lift credit constraints and allow firms to undertake 
more productive and riskier investments (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997) , (b) direct investment 
inflows may not only facilitate the diffusion of technology and managerial know -how but also 
improve the skill composition of labor (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Borenztein  et al. 1998; 
Haskell et al. 2007), (c) higher international financial integration may raise the depth and the 
scope of domestic financial markets by lowering rents and improving the quality and increasing 
availability of financial services (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Calderon and Kubota, 2009), and (d) the 
free flow of foreign capital may have a “discipline effect” on macroeconomic policy –although 
the  evidence  is  robust  for  monetary  policy  rather  than  fiscal  policy  (Tytell  and  Wei,  2005; 
Rogoff, 2007; Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 2009b). Others argue that the inherent volatility of 
these  flows  brings  instability  and  uncertainty.  In  particular,  business  cycles  might  become 
amplified, relative prices might get distorted, and crises might be more frequent. All these 
effects  could  have  an  adverse  impact  on  long-run  income  levels.  Rising  financial  openness 
appear to elevate the frequency and the severity of currency and banking crisis (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart,  1999).  Finally,  the  pro-cyclicality  of  capital  flows  has  a  perverse  effect  on 
macroeconomic stability. Consumption and government expenditure grow excessively during 
periods of capital flow bonanza and they tend to adjust drastically when foreign capital stops 
coming into the domestic economy. This lack of access to world capital markets during bad 
times  may  hamper  the  ability  of  governments  to  conduct  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policies 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2005; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008). 
 
Capital  flows  pose  serious  challenges  for  policymakers.  For  instance,  in  bad  times,  when 
countries face disruptions in international capital markets (as those experienced in the late 
1990s), the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy usually become seriously contested. The 
key policy question would be how countries ensure the flow of international credit to finance 
trade. How does the private sector finance its investment? How does it guarantee that ongoing 
                                                 
2 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) document that emerging market economies have been accumulating large stocks 
of US treasury bills going into official reserve assets and have been receiving large inflows of FDI and portfolio 
equity, as well as private bond market inflows. 
3 Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009a) argue that the benefits of financial globalization can be better understood 
by their indirect effects on important growth drivers. For instance, local capital markets are deeper in financially 
integrated economies (Klein and Olivei, 2008). Public and corporate governance also improve in countries with 
higher financial openness (Stultz, 2005). 4 
 
infrastructure projects remain on track? Alternatively, in good times, when foreign capital flows 
into the domestic economy, policymakers typically ask what type of policies are effective to 
manage  this  surge  of  capital  inflows.  How  can  countries  limit  the  real  appreciation  of  the 
domestic currency to avoid a loss in competitiveness? How can countries tailor the structure of 
capital  flows  that  they  receive  to  their  development  needs?  Should  they  strengthen  their 
institutional and financial infrastructure? As a result, the effects of capital flows on policy-
making are large both in good times and in bad times.
4  
 
The main goal of this paper is to re-examine the determinants of sudden stops by distinguishing 
the different sources of the decline in the financial account of the balance of payments . We 
evaluate whether the determinants of sudden stops may differ by type —that is, whether the 
same set of forcing variables have different impact on the drop in the financial account when 
driven by a reduction in inflows from foreign investors or when driven by a larger outflow by 
domestic residents. We first argue that the decision of foreign investors may be different from 
that of domestic ones because of information asymmetries. For instance, foreign investors may 
have  informational  disadvantages  relative  to  domestic  investors  regarding  the  investment 
climate of the domestic economy, differences in regulatory frameworks, intricate tax systems, 
and differences in the efficiency of the judiciary system, among others. The differences in the 
decision making process of foreign vis-à-vis domestic investors can also be attributed to the 
differences in reading and evaluating information –which, in turn, is determined by the costs of 
processing information on the domestic economy. However, we should recognize that with all 
the  advances  in  information  and  communication  technology  (ICT),  those  differences  are 
narrowing.  Finally,  foreign  investors  may  be  more  sensitive  than  local  investors  to  “push 
factors” of capital flows into the domestic economy. For instance, global investors are more 
prone to invest their capital in the domestic economy if the returns in their economies (say, the 
interest rate in the foreign country) are lower. If local investors may still invest in the foreign 
country despite the lower world interest rate, considerations on foreign assets as safe assets 
(say, US T-bills) may prevail. This paper also presents some empirical evidence on the different 
time-bunching of sudden stops by source (Figure 4) and the differences in their macroeconomic 
consequences  (Figure  5  and  Table  6).  These  findings  may  indicate  differences  in  the 
determinants of sudden stops driven by foreign investors (inflow-driven) vis-à-vis those driven 
by  decisions  of  local  investors  (outflow-driven).  If  that  is  the  case,  preventive  policies 
implemented by governments will also differ. 
 
In order to analyze the questions in this paper we gather information on gross capital flows for 
185 countries from 1970 to 2007. Then our effective sample is reduced to 82 countries while 
eliminating small countries (i.e. with population less than 1 million in 2007 and gross national 
income per capita lower than US$ 2000) and countries with few observations (i.e. less than 9 
consecutive annual observations). We follow the procedure outlined in Guidotti, Sturzenegger 
and Villar (2004) to define a sudden stop as the reduction in the financial account that is at least 
one standard deviation below the mean and exceed 5 percent of GDP. To ascertain whether the 
                                                 
4 Kose, Elekdag and Cardarelli (2009) have recently documented the policy responses to surges in private capital 
inflows across a wide array of developing and industrial countries. 5 
 
sudden stop in net inflows is caused by either local residents or foreign residents, we follow 
Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco and Neilson (2008) in calculating the contribution of gross inflows 
to  the  decline  in  the  financial  account.  These  authors  distinguish  among:  (a)  inflow-driven 
sudden stops when drops in the financial account are caused by foreign residents who cut off 
the domestic economy from foreign capital, (b) outflow-driven sudden stops when the financial 
account fallout is due to local residents who take their money abroad; and, (c) the mixed cases 
when we cannot distinguish a decrease in the financial account caused by lower gross inflows 
from those caused by higher gross outflows. 
 
This paper consists of five sections. Following the introduction in Section 1, Section 2 reviews 
the literature on the determinants of sudden stops while Section 3 describes the data and some 
presents stylized facts on sudden stops, its sources and consequences. Section 4 presents the 
empirical  evidence  with  limited  dependent  variable  techniques.  These  techniques  evaluate 
whether a certain set of indicators can help determine and predict the likelihood of a sudden 
stop. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Brief Literature Review 
 
In a series of seminal papers, Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that, unlike 
developed economies, emerging market economies may frequently lose their access to  the 
international  capital  markets.  These  large  negative  swings  in  capital  inflows,  which  Calvo 
denoted  as  sudden  stops,  may  render  the  country  insolvent  or  dramatically  reduce  the 
productivity of its existing capital. This may result from large unexpected changes in relative 
prices and bankrupts. Sudden stop episodes are formally defined by Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía 
(2004) as those events that meet the following two conditions: first, they should start when the 
first annual change in capital flows falls one standard deviation below the mean. Second, they 
should be “unexpected” (i.e. the annual variation in capital flows should be at least once two 
standard deviations below its sample mean), and “persistent” (it should end when the annual 
variation exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean). Theoretically, Calvo et al. 
(2004, 2008) build a model that stresses the role of external imbalances (as proxied by massive 
current  account  deficits)  and  liability  dollarization  (which  reflect  currency  mismatches)  in 
creating the conditions for sudden stops. They point out that the vulnerability of an economy to 
sudden stops is exacerbated by the degree of dollarization in the private and public sectors, and 
the sensitivity of the real exchange rate (RER) to capital flow reversals. The authors suggest for 
the latter that external financing of the absorption of traded goods is smaller if the economy is 
more  open. Hence, the impact of  sudden stops in capital flows  on  RER  is smaller the  less 
leveraged is the absorption of traded goods. Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2008) focus on large 
and unexpected fall in capital flows triggered by exogenous drivers —the so-called systemic 
sudden stops. In addition to the requirements stated in their previous paper (Calvo, Izquierdo 
and Mejía, 2004), the identified sudden stop window coincides with a period of sharp increase 
in aggregate spreads. They also argue that countries are more prone to sudden stops when 6 
 
they have high (public and private) liability dollarization and when their exchange rate is very 
responsive to reversals in the financial account. Financial integration, on the other hand, may 
reduce the probability of sudden stops by allowing countries to access funds from abroad and 
increasing risk-sharing opportunities.  
 
The empirical literature on sudden stops has usually chosen the set of forcing variables which 
determines  the  likelihood  of  sudden  stops  from  the  related  literature  on  currency  crisis, 
banking crisis and current account reversals. In this context it has been argued that countries’ 
weaknesses  and  vulnerabilities  would  mater  when  investors  rebalance  their  portfolios. 
Research  in  this  area  has  specifically  focused  on  the  soundness  of  macroeconomic  policy 
framework, the health of external and fiscal accounts, and the fragility in the financial sector.
5 
Excessive expansion in monetary and fiscal policies (usually captured by high inflation and large 
fiscal deficits), external imbalances (as proxied by current account deficits and exchange rate 
overvaluation), and rapid credit creation may change investor’s sentiment towards leaving the 
country. Although countries with current account deficits are more likely to have  sudden stop 
(Calvo  et  al.  2004,  2008;  Cavallo  and  Frankel,  2008;  Kaminsky,  2008;  Edwards,  2009),  the 
literature  fails  to  find  a  higher  likelihood  of  sudden  stops  in  countries  with  greater  fiscal 
imbalances and a higher debt burden in the short term.
6 External shocks are also important as 
Edwards (2009) finds that an increase in the world real interest rate —by signaling a reduction 
of global liquidity— raises the propensity of emerging markets to sudden stops. However, he 
could not find any significant effect from terms of trade shocks. Moreover, Caner et al. (2009) 
finds that external vulnerability raises the likelihood of sudden stops and reduces the speed of 
adjustment of output to its equilibrium level.  
 
In addition, Calderon and Kubota (2009a) examine the likelihood of a sharp depreciation in the 
RER which may ensue from sudden stops. They find that unsound macroeconomic policies and 
external  imbalances  (as  proxied  by  high  inflation  and  overvalued  real  exchange  rates, 
respectively)  explain  the  country’s  susceptibility  to  large  real  exchange  rate  depreciations. 
Positive  terms  of  trade  shocks,  higher  growth  of  their  trading  partners  and  self-insurance 
strategies (as proxied by the ratio of reserves to imports) reduce the vulnerability to large real 
depreciations. Analogous to the Cavallo and Frankel (2008) result with sudden stops, trade 
openness  reduces  the  vulnerability  to  sudden  stops  while  the  effect  of  financial  openness 
depends on the structure of external assets. While equity integration reduces the likelihood of 
large real depreciations, debt integration increases its likelihood. 
 
 
                                                 
5 By healthy external and fiscal account we imply (inter-temporally) sustainable current account and fiscal 
balances. 
6 Calvo (2003) argue that highly indebted countries and those with smaller capacity to service debt are more 
susceptible to sudden stops. However, the evidence fails to confirm this hypothesis (Calvo et al. 2004, 2008). 7 
 
3. The Data 
 
This section describes the operational definition of sudden stops as well as that of sudden stops 
driven by either inflow contraction or outflow expansion. This section also enumerates the 
sources of data used to construct this variable. We then outline the definition and the sources 
of data and sudden stops and their determinants in our regression analysis.  
 
3.1 Sudden Stops: Definitions and Facts 
 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) define a sudden stop as an episode that takes place when the 
reduction in net capital flows is more than one standard deviation from the mean (and there is 
at least one decline of more than two standard deviations below the mean) and ends when the 
annual change in capital flows is greater than one standard deviation below the mean. To 
identify these episodes, they use monthly data on the so-called “capital flow proxy” that results 
from  subtracting  the  monthly  change  in  international  reserves  from  the  trade  balance. 
However,  in  this  paper  we  follow  the  definition  of  sudden  stops  devised  by  Guidotti, 
Sturzenegger and Villar (2004). Their definition of sudden stops state that these events take 
place when the financial account falls one standard deviation above below the sample mean, 
and this decline in the financial account exceeds 5 percent of GDP. If we denote FA as the 
financial account, sudden stops will then occur when the following two conditions are met: 
 
   
05 . 0   




FA FA FA  
 
05 . 0    t FA  
 
where  is the difference operator while  and  represent the mean and standard deviation 
operators, respectively. 
 
Inflow-driven  vs.  Outflow-driven  Sudden  Stops.  A  decline  in  the  financial  account  could  be 
motivated  by  decisions  of  foreign  residents  and/or  by  those  of  domestic  residents.  In  this 
context net inflows could sharply decline due to: (a) local residents pulling their capital out of 
the country, or (b) foreign residents not pouring new financial resources into the domestic 
economy. We note that these two different events have different policy implications.  
 
To differentiate sudden stops caused by local residents’ decisions from those mainly explained 
by  the  behavior  of  foreign  investors  we  follow  the  identification  procedure  developed  by 
Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco and Neilson (2008).
7 We first  take the strategy implemented by 
                                                 
7 Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) follow Calvo et al. (2004) methodology to identify sudden stops and, afterwards, 
they distinguish between sudden flights and sudden stops. They identify as sudden flights those episodes where 
the increase in gross financial outflows is greater than the decline in gross financial inflows. Moreover, true sudden 
stops are characterized by decisions of global investors and take place when the fall in gross inflows is greater than 
the pick-up in gross outflows. 
 8 
 
Guidotti et al (2004) to identify drops in financial account. Then we follow the methodology 
devised by Cowan et al (2008) to distinguish between inflow-driven and outflow-driven sudden 













where  t I   and  t O   represent changes in gross inflows and gross outflows, respectively. The 
identification then proceeds as follows: an inflow-driven sudden stop takes place if  75 . 0 
I
t S  
during a sudden stop episode. An outflow-driven sudden stop occurs if  25 . 0 
I
t S .  
 
How Often Do Sudden Stops Occur? Figure 1 shows the frequency of sudden stops for the 
sample  of  all  countries  (82),  industrial  and  developing  countries.  We  find  204  episodes  of 
sudden stops over the period 1970-2007 –of which 159 episodes correspond to developing 
countries and the remaining 45 to industrial countries. We also observe that sudden stops are 
more likely to take place after 1990. Roughly, 70 percent of the sudden stop episodes occur in 
the 1990-2007 period (139 out of 204 events).  
 
Are Sudden Stops Driven by Local or Foreign Investors? To distinguish sudden stops caused by 
decisions of local residents vis-à-vis foreign investors we first calculate the contribution of gross 
inflows to the fall in net inflows, S
I. Figure 2 reports the value of its ratio for all sudden stops 
identified (204) as well as those only for industrial countries (45) and developing countries 
(159).  The  histograms  depicted  in  Figure  2  show  that  most  sudden  stop  episodes  among 
industrial and developing countries are driven by the behavior of foreign investors –that is, the 
number  of  events  where  S
I  >  0.75  is  greater  than  that  of  events  where  S
I  <  0.25.  In  fact, 
approximately 20% of the full sample of sudden stops is driven by outflows (that is, S
I < 0.25) 
whereas  almost  60%  is  inflow-driven  (S
I  >  0.75).  The  proportion  of  events  caused  by  local 
investors pulling out resources from their countries elevates to 33% in the case of industrial 
countries. Finally, note that if we abstract from the episodes that cannot be unequivocally 
attributed  to  either  lower  inflows  or  greater  outflows,  Figure  3  presents  the  histogram  of 
sudden stop episodes by sources. We observe not only that the frequency of events increases 
after 1990 but also that outflow-driven sudden stops (linked to decisions by local residents) are 
more  common  after  2000.  In  addition,  the  distribution  of  inflow-  vis-à-vis  outflow-driven 
sudden stops over time is different (Figure 3 and Figure 4). For instance, the inflow-driven 
sudden-stops appear to be bunched together in the periods 1978-83, 1988-91, and 1997-2001 
whereas the outflow-driven ones seem to be more sparsely distributed over time. 
 
Do their Macroeconomic Consequences Differ? It is important to point out that the distinction 
between inflow- and outflow-driven sudden stops does matter for macroeconomic outcomes. 
Figure 5 depicts the behavior of the rate of growth in real GDP per worker, capital stock per 
worker, and total factor productivity (TFP) during inflow- and outflow-driven sudden stops. 
Whereas  Figure  6  shows  the  evolution  of  growth  in  real  output,  total  consumption  and 9 
 
domestic investment, Figure 7 shows the behavior of financial development indicators around 
sudden  stop  episodes.  To  understand  the  dynamics  around  sudden  stops  we  will  focus  on 
discussion on the results for the full sample of countries.
8  
 
In Figure 5 we observe that the behavior of growth in output per worker and of growth in 
either capital stock per worker or TFP is more volatile during outflow-driven sudden stops. The 
trough in growth per worker occurs in period T (time of event) for inflow-driven sudden stops 
while it occurs in period T+1 in the event of outflow-driven stops. Compared to outflow-driven 
episodes, we observe that the trough in growth of output per worker is slightly deeper in 
inflow-driven stops whereas the recovery in output per worker surpasses the pre-sudden stop 
output per worker levels. The growth rate of the stock of capital per worker decelerates more 
sharply  in  period  T  (the  time  of  sudden  stops)  during  outflow-driven  sudden  stops.  In  the 
aftermath, capital stock per worker appears to recover at a slower pace during outflow-driven 
episodes. Finally, TFP growth increases up to period T and collapses afterwards during outflow-
driven episodes. In the meantime, recovery of TFP growth seems more robust in the aftermath 
of inflow-driven sudden stops. 
 
Figure 6 shows the behavior of GDP growth, total consumption and domestic investment during 
inflow- and outflow-driven episodes. Real GDP growth declines in period T is sharper during 
inflow-driven  sudden  stops.  Table  3  complements  the  graphical  analysis  with  some  naïve 
regressions that run macroeconomic outcomes on their lag values, sudden stops and inflow-
driven sudden stop dummies. For instance, when the sudden stop takes place (T), growth in 
GDP per worker would be more severely affected (by 1.5 percentage points) if the sudden stop 
is driven by foreign investors. The same story holds for TFP growth while the more deleterious 
effects  of  inflow-driven  sudden  stops  on  capital  per  worker  take  effect  in  period  T+1.  In 
addition, growth rates in real GDP, total consumption and domestic investment decline at a 
faster rate at the moment of the inflow-driven sudden stops than the moment of otherwise. 
(See Table 3 for more details.) 
 
Figure  7  depicts  the  behavior  of  private  credit,  leverage,  bank  assets,  stock  market 
capitalization and (private and public) bond market capitalization around inflow- and outflow-
driven sudden stops. The figure shows that the amplitude of the cycle in private credit appears 
to be larger during outflow-driven sudden stops (vis-à-vis inflow-driven ones) in both industrial 
and developing countries. Private credit among industrial countries tends to decline after the 
inflow-driven sudden stops take place as opposed to outflow-driven stops. Among developing 
countries the slowdown in the private credit to GDP ratio is more pronounced when sudden 
stops are driven by outflows. We are unable to find a systematic pattern of behavior for the 
leverage of the banking system around sudden stops among industrial countries. However, we 
observe  a  sharp  process  of  deleveraging  among  developing  countries  after  inflow-driven 
sudden stops take place. Regardless of the source of sudden stops we observe a build-up of 
bank assets among industrial countries. For developing countries bank assets start to decline 
                                                 
8 Note that the analysis of the behavior of these macroeconomic series during episodes of sudden stops for the full 
sample of countries is qualitatively similar to that of developing countries. 10 
 
after reaching a peak at the initial period of sudden stops. Stock market capitalization drops 
steadily after reaching a peak in T-1 and T for outflow- and inflow-driven sudden stops among 
industrial  countries,  respectively.  Such  marked  pattern  is  not  observed  for  developing 
countries. Private bond market capitalization (as percentage of GDP) in advanced countries 
drops in the aftermath of inflow-driven sudden stops while it grows after the event of outflow-
driven ones. For developing countries the depth of private bond markets grows steadily up to 
period T+1 with outflow-driven sudden stops and it sluggishly declined by period T+3 with 
inflow-driven ones. Finally, public bond market capitalization (as a ratio to GDP) in industrial 
countries increases after the occurrence of inflow-driven sudden stops while it slightly declines 
with outflow-driven ones. For developing countries its decline reaches its trough in period T and 
then we observe a recovery. The drop is sharper when sudden stops are driven by outflows. 
 
Net  Reversals  vis-à-vis  Gross  Reversals.  We  have  already  characterized  the  classification  of 
sudden  stops  according  to  whether  reductions  in  the  financial  account  are  explained  by 
decreasing  inflows  or  by  growing  outflows  of  capital.  However,  this  procedure  excludes 
episodes where cutbacks in foreign flows of capital into the country are offset by outflows. To 
what extent does the two-way capital flow dynamics account for the joint likelihood of gross 
and net reversals? In order to answer this question we construct a direct measure of gross 
inflow reversals and compare the incidence of these events with net reversals (i.e. sudden 
stops). We define gross inflow reversals (or, hereafter, gross reversals) as periods where the 
change in non-FDI inflows (expressed as a deviation from the average change for the country 
over the entire period and scaled by the trend component of GDP) is below -5 percent. As 
suggested  by  Cowan  et  al.  (2008),  FDI  flows  are  excluded  from  this  definition  in  order  to 
capture predominantly financial shocks. 
 
Table  1  reports  the  frequency  of  gross  inflow  reversals  and  net  reversals  for  our  effective 
sample of 82 countries from 1970 to 2007. While we identify 274 gross inflow reversals, only 
one hundred sixteen (42 percent) coincide with sudden stops (i.e. net reversals). This suggests 
that outflows mitigate the effects of inflow-related sudden stops in most of the cases (that is, 
one hundred fifty eight inflow reversals). Interestingly, a higher share of gross inflow reversals 
coincide  with  net  reversals  in  developing  countries  (97  out  of  171  or  57  percent)  than  in 
developed countries (19 out of 103 or 18 percent). For emerging markets this percentage is 
only slightly higher than for developing countries as a whole (59 percent). 
 
Sudden Stops and Crisis. The anatomy of credit booms presented by Mendoza and Terrones 
(2009) shows that not all lending booms lead to a banking crisis. In this context we also explore 
whether all sudden stop events lead to either a currency or a banking crisis. To the extent that 
drops in the financial account precede currency runs or banking runs, these events may lead to 
crisis episodes. Currency crises and banking crises are defined as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
9 
                                                 
9 According to these authors a banking crisis is characterized by two types of events: (1) if bank runs lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions (as in Venezuela in 1993 or 
Argentina in 2001); and (2) even in the absence of bank runs, there is closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale 
government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) marks the start of a string of 11 
 
 
Table 2 reports the probability of having a currency or banking crisis in period t and period t+1 
when a net or gross reversal takes place in period t. It is interesting to show that when there is 
a  net  reversal,  a  currency  crisis  is  more  likely  to  take  place  simultaneously  for  developing 
countries —and that likelihood is even higher among emerging markets. However, if it occurs in 
period  t+1,  it  is  more  likely  to  happen  in  industrial  countries.  We  should  note  that  the 
frequency is smaller among the latter group. The likelihood of having currency crisis either in 
period t or t+1 is smaller in the event of gross reversals (vis-à-vis a net reversal), and that 
likelihood is uniformly smaller among industrial nations.  
 
Finally,  the  probability  of  having  a  banking  crisis  (either  in  period  t  or  t+1)  is  smaller  for 
industrial countries than for developing countries regardless of either a gross or net reversal in 
capital flows taking place in period t. Emerging markets, on average, are more likely to have a 
banking crisis after sudden stop episodes than developing countries as a whole. This result may 
underline the higher exposure of emerging markets to cross-border asset trading. 
 
3.2 Sources of Data for the Determinants of Sudden Stops 
 
We describe the sources of data used to approximate the set of forcing variables that may 
affect the likelihood of sudden stops (as measured by drops in the financial account) as well as 
inflow-  and  outflow-driven  sudden  stops.  Our  choice  of  explanatory  variables  follows  the 
empirical literature on the determinants of (net) sudden stops (e.g. Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia, 
2004), the determinants of currency crisis (e.g.  Frankel and Rose, 1996; Berg and Pattillo, 1999; 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000), current account reversals and capital flow contractions (e.g. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Edwards, 2005, 2007). 
 
Economic performance, as measured by the growth rate of GDP, is assumed to reduce the 
likelihood of sudden stops taking place. GDP data in US dollars at constant prices, obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), is used to compute the growth 
rate. We also include indicators of the soundness and stability of the macroeconomic policy 
framework as determinants of sudden stops. It has been argued that sudden stops are less 
likely  to  take  place  in  countries  with  sounder  and  more  stable  macroeconomic  policy 
framework. Hence, we include indicators of monetary stability, exchange rate flexibility and the 
health of external and fiscal positions.  
 
Monetary stability is proxied by the rate of inflation, as measured by the rate of change of the 
consumer  price  index,  and  its  data  is  obtained  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). We include not only the rate of inflation but we also 
include the inflation rate interacted with a dummy that takes the value of 1 when CPI inflation 
exceeds 50% per year. The latter variable captures high inflation. Exchange rate flexibility is 
measured by the coarse classification of exchange rate regimes developed by Reinhart and 
                                                                                                                                                             
similar outcomes for other financial institutions (as in Thailand 1996–97). We rely on existing studies of banking 
crises and on the financial press. 12 
 
Rogoff (2004) and updated by Ilzetzky, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). This index goes from 0 to 14 
and higher values signal a more flexible exchange rate arrangement. Healthier external and 
fiscal positions are approximated by the current account balance and the central government 
budget surplus. Both variables are expressed as percentage of GDP and the data are obtained 
from  WDI  and  IFS.  Measures  of  the  health  of  the  financial  sector  are  also  included  as 
determinants of sudden stops. Among them we have bank credit, bank deposits, bank assets 
and the credit to deposit ratio. All these variables are expressed as percentage of GDP except 
for the credit to deposit ratio which is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009).
10 
 
A country’s vulnerability to sudden stops is heightened by its exposure to international good 
and asset markets. In this respect we include indicators of trade and financial openness. Our 
measure of trade openness includes the ratio of real exports plus imports to GDP and natural 
resource abundance. The latter is measured by the net exports per capita of agricultural raw 
materials, food, fuel, metals and mineral ores. The data is compiled from WDI. Openness to the 
world capital markets is measured from Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2006), as the ratio of net 
financial flows to GDP (i.e. net capital flows). To test the consistency of the financial openness 
indicators  we  break  down  this  measure  into  net  equity  vis-à-vis  net  debt  flows,  and  its 
decomposition  into  FDI,  portfolio  investment  and  other  investment.  Then  we  distinguish 
between local and foreign residents’ decisions by including gross inflows and outflows instead 
of net inflows. The data on net and gross flows is obtained from the IMF’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics. Finally, external shocks are added to the regression as controls. We proxy terms of 
trade shocks as the annual percentage change in the terms of trade index, and the data is 
collected from WDI. The world real interest rate is proxied by the money market rate of the 




4. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section aims to set up the empirical assessment on the determinants of sudden stops and 
presents the evidence obtained from our regression analysis. We use an effective sample of 82 
                                                 
10 The health of the financial system can be captured more accurately by another comprehensive set of indicators 
such as ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, bank capital to assets, non-performing loans 
(NPLs) to total gross loans, the ratio of provision to NPLs relative to total gross loans, and regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets among others. However, there are serious constraints on time series availability for these series 
(e.g. since 2000 at best) that prevents us for using them in our regression analysis. 13 
 
countries with annual information from 1970 to 2007.
11 We first test whether sudden stops are 
determined by the indicators that  capture sound macroeconomic policy frameworks, healthy 
financial sectors, outward orientation of the economy and external  shocks. Then, we examine 
whether the impact varies according to the source of sudden stops. Finally, we assess whether 
some particular features of the domestic economy (exchange rate regime in place, liability 




Our dependent variable is the binary variable SS that can only have two possible outcomes: it 
can take the value of 1 when there is a sudden stop (net, inflow-driven, outflow-driven or 
mixed) and 0, otherwise. X is a vector of explanatory variables that influence the outcome SS. 
Hence, the model takes the form:  
 
 
where  the  left  hand  side  of  the  equation  represents  the  probability  P  of  a  sudden  stop 
occurring  given  X,  and    is  the  Probit  function.  Our  goal  is  to  estimate  the  vector    of 
parameters by maximum likelihood. We specify the Probit model as a latent variable model and 
assume that there exists a random variable SS
* such that: 
SS
* = X’ +  
where  represents the error term, and SS











We denote our dependent variables as (net) sudden stops (SS), inflow-driven sudden stops 
(iSS), outflow-driven sudden stops (oSS), and the mixed cases (mSS). The definition of these 
binary variables is summarized in Section 3.1 while the variables that comprise the X matrix are 
described in Section 3.2. Note that all explanatory variables are lagged one period to avoid 
reverse causality issues. 
 
4.2 Baseline Regression 
                                                 
11 We collected annual data for 185 countries on capital flows and the determinants of sudden stops from 1970 to 
2007. We excluded from our sample countries with less than 9 consecutive observations of capital flows and small 
countries (i.e. countries with population less than 1 million in 2007 and gross national income per capita lower 
than 2,000 US dollars). Those restrictions along with other data availability problems in the set of forcing variables 
rendered an effective sample of 82 countries. 
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Table 4 shows our baseline regression on the determinants of sudden stops. Our dependent 
variable is the binary variable that takes the value of 1 when there is a (net) sudden stop –as 
defined by Guidotti et al. (2004). To compute this binary variable we need to compute the 
annual variation in the financial account to GDP ratio. To construct this ratio we use three 
different definitions of the financial account: the first definition, FA0, is the sum of the net FDI 
inflows, net portfolio inflows, and net other investment inflows. The second, FA1, results from 
the sum of FA0 and the net flows of financial derivatives and, finally, FA2, is the outcome of 
including net errors and omissions to the FA1 measure. The financial account is normalized by 
the  permanent  component  (trend)  of  GDP,  following  Cowan  et  al.  (2004).  For  robustness 
purposes we use different methods to compute the stochastic trend of GDP —say, Hodrick-
Prescott filter, the band-pass filter, the 3-year moving average and the actual GDP lagged one 
period.  We  report  the  baseline  regression  results  for  all  those  different  definitions  of  the 
financial account to GDP ratio in Table 4. 
 
We first discuss the results obtained with the FA0 definition of the financial account and, next, 
we outline whether those results hold while changing its definition to FA1 or FA2. In columns 
[1] through [4] of Table 4 we present the coefficient estimates for our baseline regression using 
our FA0 definition of the financial account. In most cases, real GDP growth in the period t is 
negatively associated to the likelihood of a sudden stop taking place in the period t+1. This 
shows that higher GDP growth would subsequently reduce the likelihood of sudden stops.  
 
Next, we discuss the role of the macroeconomic policy framework. We fail to find a significant 
relationship  among  high  inflation,  fiscal  imbalances  and  the  likelihood  of  sudden  stops. 
However, exchange rate flexibility (as proxied by an index of exchange rate regimes that takes 
higher values if the arrangements  are more flexible) enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient, and the current account coefficient is significantly positive. Hence, countries with 
less flexible exchange rate arrangements are more likely to have sudden stops whereas current 
account surpluses precede sudden stops. Finally, we find that an increase in the private credit 
to  GDP  ratio  tends  to  precede  the  occurrence  of  sudden  stops  (with  the  coefficient  being 
significant in some specifications). 
 
It is mostly argued that countries with large exposure to the world market of goods and assets 
(proxied by trade openness, natural resource abundance and financial openness) are prone to 
sudden stops. The coefficient of trade openness is not robust –it is only significant in column 
[3].  We  also  find  that  natural  resource  abundant  countries  (proxied  by  the  net  exports  of 
natural resources per capita) are more likely to experience sudden stops. Financial linkages –as 
captured by larger net financial flows– have a positive and robust coefficient in our regression 
analysis. This implies that countries with tighter international financial linkages are going to be 
more vulnerable to sudden stops. We also test whether external shocks may play a role in 
determining the likelihood of sudden stops. Our findings show that higher terms of trade may 
lead to lower probability of a subsequent sudden stop, and that increasing the world interest 
rate may be associated with a higher likelihood of sudden stops taking place although the 
relationship is not statistically robust. 15 
 
 
Sensitivity of the Baseline Results to Different Samples of Countries  
 
Table 5 reports our baseline regression for the full sample of countries (82) as well as for the 
samples of industrial countries (22), developing countries (60) and middle-income countries 
(52).  The  sudden  stop  episode,  our  dependent  variable,  is  calculated  with  using  annual 
variations of the financial account to Hodrick-Prescott trend GDP for the different definitions of 
financial account (FA0, FA1, and FA2). We note that our discussion will focus on the first four 
columns of Table 5 where we report the results of the sudden stop analysis with the FA0 
definition. 
 
Our  results  show  that,  first,  higher  growth  significantly  contributes  to  a  reduction  in  the 
likelihood  of  sudden  stops  in  the  next  period  for  developing  countries  and  middle-income 
countries  (MICs).  Second,  the  flexibility  of  the  exchange  rate  arrangement  is  also  a  key  in 
reducing the vulnerability of developing countries and MICs to sudden stops. However, it does 
not seem to play a role among industrial countries. Third, industrial countries with current 
account surpluses in period T are more likely to have sudden stops in the next period T+1. 
Current  account  deficits  in  period  T  would  spell  sudden  stops  of  inflows  for  developing 
countries and MICs; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Fourth, rising bank 
credit (that outpaces growth in real output) may help signal the probability of sudden stops 
occurring in the subsequent period for developing countries and MICs. Fifth, natural resource 
abundant MICs are more prone to have sudden stops in net capital inflows. The evidence is not 
robust for either industrial or developing countries. Sixth, international financial integration 
heightens  the  vulnerability  of  industrial,  developing  countries  and  MICs  to  sudden  stops. 
Finally, the incidence of external shocks does not seem to play a role in elevating the propensity 
of the country to sudden stops.  
 
Finally, when we include (net) financial derivatives and net errors and omissions in our financial 
account (definition FA2), movements in the world interest rate may affect the likelihood of 
sudden stops. This effect is mainly driven by industrial countries. 
 
4.3 Sources of Sudden Stop: Local vis-à-vis Foreign Residents’ Decisions 
 
This subsection aims to examine whether the results presented above hold for different types 
of sudden stops. As we argued above, the decline in the financial account –used to identify 
sudden  stops–  could  obey  decisions  of  global  investors  (inflow-driven)  or  local  residents 
(outflow-driven). In Table 6 we report the baseline regression (reported both in Tables 4 and 5) 
for  sudden  stops  (SS)  as  defined  by  Guidotti  et  al.  (2004),  and  we  also  regress  the  same 
specification for inflow-driven sudden stops (iSS), outflow-driven sudden stops (oSS) and mixed 
cases (mSS). We present the evidence for the full sample of countries, for the four (4) different 
types of sudden stops and for the three (3) different definitions of the financial account (FA0, 
FA1, FA2) in Table 6. 
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When  we  examine  the  results  for  inflow-  and  outflow-driven  sudden  stops  vis-à-vis  (net) 
sudden stops –as defined by Calvo and operationalized by Guidotti et al. (2004)–, we find that 
the driving forces behind inflow- and outflow-driven sudden stops may differ. In what follows, 
we will discuss the differences in the coefficient estimates for the equation of inflow-driven 
sudden stops vis-à-vis outflow-driven ones. First, growth in real GDP in period t helps reduce 
the likelihood of inflow-driven sudden stops in the next period t+1 whereas it has no significant 
effect on outflow-driven ones. Regarding the macroeconomic policy framework the flexibility of 
the exchange rate arrangement seems to matter for global investors rather than local residents. 
Countries with more flexible exchange rate arrangements are less prone to sudden stops driven 
by global investors. However, the flexibility of the exchange rate regime seems to play no role 
in  driving  local  residents’  decision  to  pull  resources  out  of  the  country.  Moreover,  current 
account  surpluses  in  the  period  t  seem  to  have  preceded  sudden  stops  caused  by  local 
residents. Analogously, rapid increases in credit (that exceeds the growth of output) would 
raise the likelihood of subsequent sudden stops driven by outflows (i.e. local residents). 
 
The exposure of the domestic country to the world good and asset markets is assumed to have 
an impact on the likelihood of sudden stops. The evidence presented in Table 6 shows that 
natural resource abundant countries may be more prone to inflow-driven sudden stops. This 
may be linked to the volatility of the export (and, maybe, tax) base (which, in turn, is associated 
to the heightened volatility of terms of trade shocks). According to our findings,  countries 
which are tightly linked with the world capital market are more prone to both inflow- and 
outflow-driven sudden stops. Finally, an increase in the world real interest rate would tend to 
raise the likelihood of inflow-driven sudden stops in the subsequent period. This may be partly 
explained by return-chasing global investors who stop their investment flows into the domestic 
economy.  
 
Table 7 presents analogous regression estimates to those of Table 6 for different sub-samples 
of countries: industrial countries, developing countries, and middle-income countries (MICs).  
 
Industrial Countries. We show that higher GDP growth would reduce the vulnerability to inflow-
driven sudden stops and have no impact on outflow-driven ones. Current account surpluses 
precede the event of either inflow- or outflow-driven sudden stops among industrial countries. 
Excess  credit  growth  (relative  to  output  growth)  would  raise  the  likelihood  of  subsequent 
outflow-driven sudden stops. Finally, both inflow- and outflow-driven sudden stops are more 
likely to happen in countries with rising financial openness. 
 
Developing  Countries.  The  soundness  and  stability  of  macroeconomic  policy  framework  –
proxied by low inflation, flexible exchange rate arrangements and healthy fiscal and external 
balances– does not seem to matter when local investors decide to pull their capital out of the 
domestic  country.  However,  the  flexibility  of  exchange  rate  regimes  seems  to  lower  the 
vulnerability of the domestic country to inflow-driven sudden stops. In contrast to industrial 
countries excess credit growth would raise the probability of inflow-driven sudden stops. This 
finding implies that credit booms may increase the likelihood of foreign investors refraining 
from pouring more capital into the economy. International financial integration does heighten 17 
 
the vulnerability of countries to both inflow- and outflow- driven sudden stops. Trade openness 
and natural resource abundance do not seem to play a role in driving the likelihood of any 
source of sudden stops. The same holds external shocks. Finally, the results for middle-income 
countries are qualitatively similar to those of the sample of developing countries. 
 
Robustness to Different Financial Indicators 
 
Table 8 replicates the first four columns of Table 6–columns [1], [5], [9], and [13] of Table 8– 
and examines the robustness of our results to other indicators of financial development. In our 
baseline regression we use the ratio of bank credit to GDP. In Table 8 we present estimates with 
other financial indicators such as the ratio of bank deposits to GDP, the credit to deposit ratio, 
and the ratio of bank assets to GDP. While analyzing the determinants of (net) sudden stops, 
we find that bank credit and bank deposits have a significant coefficient, however, the credit to 
deposit ratio plays no role. In the case of inflow-driven sudden stops indicators of the health of 
the financial system do not seem to have a significant effect on the likelihood of sudden stops 
driven by global investors. In the case of outflow-driven sudden stops only bank credit has a 
positive and significant coefficient.  
 
Robustness to Different Indicators of Financial Openness 
 
Table  9  examines  the  sensitivity  of  our  baseline  results  to  different  indicators  of  financial 
openness. In addition to our baseline results with net financial inflows –columns [1], [5], [9], 
and [13] of Table 9– we now account for the different types of net flows: (a) net equity vis-à-vis 
net debt flows, (b) net FDI, net foreign portfolio and net other investment flows, and (c) net 
FDI, net foreign portfolio equity flows and net debt flows.  
 
While looking at the determinants of (net) sudden stops, we find that higher net equity and net 
debt flows raise the vulnerability of the domestic country to sudden stops. The same results 
hold  when  we  include  in  our  regression,  FDI,  foreign  portfolio  and  other  investment.  We 
observe that the coefficient of (net) other investment inflows is larger. In the case of inflow-
driven sudden stops Table 9 shows that rising equity and debt flows seem to increase the 
vulnerability to sudden stops caused by global investors (column [7] of Table 9). The higher 
coefficient of net equity flows is explained by the dynamics of foreign portfolio (column [6]) or 
foreign portfolio equity flows (column [8]). In fact, the smallest coefficient is exhibited by net 
FDI inflows. This implies that FDI is the type of flow which would have the smallest impact on 
the vulnerability of the country to inflow-driven sudden stops. FDI also has the largest positive 
coefficient  vis-à-vis  other  types  of  flows  (see  columns  [10]  and  [12])  in  our  outflow-driven 
sudden stop regressions. In contrast to Table 9, we use gross inflows and gross outflows as 
measures of financial openness in Table 10. All gross inflows and outflows have a positive and 
significant coefficient. Equity-type flows (FDI and foreign portfolio inflows and outflows) have a 
smaller coefficient than that of debt-type flows (other investment). The coefficient of FDI is 
positive  and  significantly  lower  than  that  of  foreign  portfolio  and  other  investment.  For 
outflow-driven sudden stops, this result does not hold. 
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Investigating Amplifiers in the Domestic Economy 
 
In Tables 11 through 13 we investigate whether some characteristics of the economy amplify 
the effect of external shocks on the likelihood of sudden stops (net, inflow-driven, outflow-
driven and mixed cases). Table 11 examines whether the exchange rate regime acts as a buffer 
to external shocks. We add the interaction between terms of trade shocks and the index of 
exchange rate regime as well as the interaction between the world real interest rate and the 
exchange rate regime. We fail to find a significant coefficient for either of these interactions. 
Table 12 evaluates whether the impact of external shocks on the likelihood of sudden stops is 
heightened in countries with higher extent of dollarization. For this analysis we interact the 
degree of deposit dollarization with both terms of trade shocks and the world real interest rate. 
We fail to find a significant coefficient for all interaction effects. Finally, Table 13 tests whether 
trade  and  financial  openness  mitigate  or  amplify  the  effects  of  external  shocks  on  the 
probability of sudden stops. A rise in the world real interest rate would raise the likelihood of 
(net) sudden stops and outflow-driven sudden stops in countries that are highly integrated to 
international capital markets.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The  main  goal  of  our  paper  is  to  examine  whether  the  (sensitivity  and  strength  of  the) 
determinants of inflow- and outflow-driven sudden stops may differ. Hence, we test whether 
inflow-driven  and  outflow-driven  sudden  stops  are  explained  by  a  similar  set  of  forcing 
variables. Does the decision of local investors to pull their funds out of the country respond to 
the  same  determinants  as  that  of  foreign  investors  to  stop  putting  their  capital  into  the 
domestic economy? We argue that if this is not the case, the set of policies required to prevent 
sudden  stops  may  differ  depending  upon  the  type  of  sudden  stops  afflicting  the  domestic 
economy. 
 
We first show some stylized facts on the different types of sudden stops. We find that: first, 
sudden stops are differently distributed over time. While inflow-driven sudden stops are usually 
agglomerated over time, outflow-driven ones are more isolated. Outflow-driven sudden stops 
also have become a more common theme in the 2000s. Second, the distinction among types of 
sudden stops does matter for macroeconomic outcomes. A sharp reduction of foreign capital 
into the domestic economy puts an additional cost in terms of lower GDP growth and smaller 
growth in gross domestic investment. Finally, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that 
growth in GDP per worker at the moment of sudden stops would be more severely affected (by 
an additional 1.5 percentage points) if the sudden stops are caused by global residents reducing 
their inflows to the domestic economy. The same story holds for TFP growth. 
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These findings may indicate that the forces driving inflow-driven sudden stops may differ from 
those driving outflow-driven sudden stops. Hence, we conduct our regression analysis on the 
determinants of the likelihood of sudden stops taking place by estimating a Probit model using 
an “effective” sample of 82 countries with annual information over the period 1970-2007. We 
find the following results: 
 
First, global investors are more likely to pull out or stop bringing their funds to countries with 
volatile  export  base  (as  proxied  by  natural  resource  abundance),  and  poor  economic 
performance (as signaled by low growth). Rigid exchange rate regimes and high integration to 
financial markets heighten the vulnerability of the country to the whims of global investors.  
 
Second,  local  residents  are  prone  to  invest  their  money  abroad  when  the  macroeconomic 
framework is unsound (as proxied by high inflation) and/or when there is a boom in earnings 
from  sales  abroad  (i.e.  current  account  surpluses).  Rising  international  financial  integration 
facilitates local investors to divert resources into foreign assets. 
 
Third, financial openness makes the domestic country more vulnerable to sudden stops caused 
by either global investors or local residents. Inflow-driven sudden stops are less frequent in 
countries with higher shares of FDI (net and gross) in total flows (net and gross) although local 
residents  are  more  likely  to  invest  abroad  (outflow-driven  sudden  stops)  in  countries  with 
higher shares of FDI. 
 
Fourth, the health of the financial system seems to affect only the decisions of local investors to 
pull their funds out of the country (outflow-driven sudden stops). This result, however, is not 
robust to other indicators.  
 
Fifth,  some  policy  implications  can  be  extracted  from  our  empirical  analysis.  We  find  that 
domestic investors invest their capital abroad in times of macroeconomic mismanagement –as 
signaled by the lack of price stability– or when there are high external savings. Regarding the 
former, a coherent and sustainable macroeconomic framework that guarantee price stability 
(low inflation) and shield the economy from destabilizing shocks required. The latter refers to a 
stylized  fact  observed  in  emerging  markets: countries  exporting  savings  and  importing  FDI. 
According to a recent strand of the literature, this trend reflects financial system inefficiencies 
associated  with  underdeveloped  financial  markets  –which,  in  turn,  raise  the  cost  of  debt 
financing for domestic firms (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008; Valderrama and Smith, 
2009). Hence, policies towards the deepening of local financial markets may help domestic 
agents redirect their funds towards a richer menu of financial instruments at home. 
 
The likelihood of sudden stops in gross inflows to the domestic country (by foreign investors) is 
lower when the domestic economy is growing and the world interest rate is lower. To some 
extent, push factors such as the evolution of the world interest rate help determine the entry of 
foreign capital. Hence, policymakers should build sound macroeconomic policy frameworks that 
shield the economy from fluctuations in external factors —such as, movements in the world 
interest rates. If lower interest rates in industrial economies (ceteris paribus the level of global 20 
 
risk  aversion)  lead  to  rising  financial  flows  and  financial  excesses  in  the  domestic  financial 
markets  (through  booms  in  credit  and/or  equity  markets,  and  real  appreciation  of  the 
currency), policymakers may implement macro-prudential policies to stem the excess creation 
of  credit.    Finally,  policymakers  can  affect  the  pull  factors  of  capital  flows  through  their 
decisions  (e.g.  growth  in  the  domestic  economy).  In  this  respect,  the  design  of  policies  to 
maintain  sustained  growth  in  real  economic  activity  (e.g.  innovation,  investment  climate, 
capital market reform, among others) may play a crucial role. 
 
Finally, further avenues of research arise from our analysis between inflow- and outflow-driven 
sudden stops. We are currently examining the linkages between upturns and downturns in 
foreign capital and the evolution of domestic credit to the private sector. Do credit cycles and 
capital-flow cycles co-move? Are all sudden stops accompanied by drops in domestic credit? If 
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Table 1
Coincidence between net and gross reversals
Gross & net  Only gross Only net
Region reversals coincide reversal reversals
Industrial Countries 19 84 21
Developing Countries 97 74 64
  - Emerging markets 55 39 25
ALL Countries 116 158 85
Note: We calculated the net and gross reversals in capital flows using the FA1 definition of the financial account (net
FDI liabilities, net PI liabilities, net OI liabilities, and net financial derivatives) while gross reversals are calculated using
gross non-FDI capital inflows (i.e. gross PI, OI and financial derivatives liabilities).
Table 2
Coincidence between net reversals, gross reversals and crisis
All Industrial Developing Emerging
Probability Countries Countries Countries Markets
P(Currency crisis in t/ Net reversal in t) 0.1561 0.0909 0.1739 0.2125
P(Currency crisis in t+1/ Net reversal in t) 0.1366 0.2045 0.1180 0.0750
P(Currency crisis in t/ Gross reversal in t) 0.1227 0.0566 0.1637 0.2021
P(Currency crisis in t+1/ Gross reversal in t) 0.1155 0.1226 0.1111 0.0957
P(Currency crisis in t/ NR-GR coincide in t) 0.1500 0.0000 0.1856 0.2182
P(Currency crisis in t+1/ NR-GR coincide in t) 0.1667 0.3043 0.1340 0.0909
P(Banking crisis in t/ Net reversal in t) 0.0683 0.0455 0.0745 0.1375
P(Banking crisis in t+1/ Net reversal in t) 0.0341 0.0227 0.0373 0.0625
P(Banking crisis in t/ Gross reversal in t) 0.0686 0.0377 0.0877 0.1489
P(Banking crisis in t+1/ Gross reversal in t) 0.0433 0.0377 0.0468 0.0532
P(Banking crisis in t/ NR-GR coincide in t) 0.1083 0.0870 0.1134 0.1818
P(Banking crisis in t+1/ NR-GR coincide in t) 0.0417 0.0435 0.0412 0.0545
Note: We calculated the net and gross reversals in capital flows using the FA1 definition of the financial account (net FDI liabilities, net
PI liabilities, net OI liabilities, and net financial derivatives) while gross reversals are calculated using gross non-FDI capital inflows (i.e.
gross PI, OI and financial derivatives liabilities). The definition of currency and banking crisis episodes follows Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).24 
 
Table 3
Growth performance during sudden stops
Least squares (including country- and time-specific dummies)
Growth per worker Growth rate
GDP Capital TFP GDP Consumption Investment
I. ALL Countries
Dependent variable 0.3306 ** 0.5729 ** 0.2741 ** 0.4209 ** 0.0692 ** 0.1607 **
   (lagged) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Sudden stop (SS)
  SS(t) -0.0141 -1.2948 ** 0.3950 -0.0091 * -0.0059 -0.0712 **
(0.597) (0.328) (0.571) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019)
  SS(t-1) -1.2359 ** 0.1752 -1.1435 ** -0.0109 ** -0.0183 ** -0.0250
(0.607) (0.333) (0.578) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019)
  SS(t-2) -0.0900 -0.2820 0.1275 0.0016 -0.0018 0.0550 **
(0.626) (0.343) (0.596) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020)
Inflow-driven sudden stop (iSS)
  iSS(t-1) -1.5208 ** 0.1922 -1.7211 ** -0.0142 ** -0.0252 ** -0.0388 *
(0.772) (0.422) (0.734) (0.007) (0.009) (0.024)
  iSS(t-1) 0.8506 -0.9702 ** 1.0619 0.0065 -0.0018 -0.0222
(0.782) (0.428) (0.745) (0.007) (0.009) (0.024)
  iSS(t-2) 0.8392 -0.0489 0.4832 0.0061 -0.0003 -0.0705 **
(0.800) (0.438) (0.761) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024)
Nobs. 3100 2985 2985 3068 2137 2534
R**2 0.258 0.685 0.197 0.351 0.163 0.173
II. DEVELOPING Countries
Dependent variable 0.3273 ** 0.5582 ** 0.2730 ** 0.4178 ** 0.0389 0.1497 **
   (lagged) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020)
Sudden stop (SS)
  SS(t) 0.1294 -1.6791 ** 0.6735 -0.0124 * -0.0105 -0.0972 **
(0.790) (0.432) (0.759) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026)
  SS(t-1) -1.7415 ** 0.0289 -1.5206 ** -0.0147 ** -0.0294 ** -0.0346
(0.808) (0.440) (0.772) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026)
  SS(t-2) -0.0011 -0.2044 0.2430 0.0029 -0.0080 0.0714 **
(0.843) (0.454) (0.798) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026)
Inflow-driven sudden stop (iSS)
  iSS(t-1) -1.7243 * 0.3720 -1.9866 ** -0.0126 -0.0269 ** -0.0241
(1.006) (0.548) (0.962) (0.009) (0.014) (0.031)
  iSS(t-1) 1.3518 -0.8389 * 1.4975 * 0.0098 0.0046 -0.0135
(1.024) (0.556) (0.979) (0.009) (0.014) (0.032)
  iSS(t-2) 0.8332 -0.1924 0.4362 0.0066 0.0084 -0.0824 **
(1.055) (0.571) (1.004) (0.009) (0.014) (0.032)
Nobs. 2272 2184 2184 2241 1375 1790
R**2 0.267 0.696 0.200 0.349 0.158 0.184
Notes: Sudden stop (SS) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 whenever: (a) the financial account drops one standard deviation below the
sample mean, and (b) the fall in the financial account exceeds 5 percent of GDP. This definition follows Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004).
Inflow-driven sudden stops (iSS) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 whenever: (a) there are financial account reversals (as in SS), and
(b) this fall is mostly explained by a decline in inflows rather than an increase in outflows. This definition follows Cowan et al. (2008).




Determinants of Sudden Stops: Baseline regression
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is a reversal in the financial account (FA)
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop
FA Definition   1/ FA0 FA0 FA0 FA0 FA1 FA1 FA1 FA1 FA2 FA2 FA2 FA2
Normalized by:   2/ HP-trend Y BP-trend Y Moving Avg(Y) Lagged Y HP-trend Y BP-trend Y Moving Avg(Y) Lagged Y HP-trend Y BP-trend Y Moving Avg(Y) Lagged Y
GDP growth -3.822197** -3.400256** -3.509945** -1.894003 -3.160636* -2.795399* -3.455335** -1.613114 -1.381005 -0.723255 -2.331321 -1.213051
  (lagged) [1.672780] [1.581320] [1.526863] [1.480596] [1.690730] [1.607185] [1.556435] [1.496903] [1.535878] [1.501151] [1.447239] [1.381985]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.459701 -0.033294 0.249116 0.432835 -0.478296 -0.044452 0.189426 0.387642 0.836973 0.718235 0.599839 0.877165
  (lagged) [0.772164] [0.701588] [0.672593] [0.670590] [0.784858] [0.717231] [0.690438] [0.683852] [0.670294] [0.653405] [0.633596] [0.608238]
High Inflation 0.421645 -0.001541 -0.295966 -0.478264 0.442615 0.012428 -0.235418 -0.430006 -0.855022 -0.733879 -0.599916 -0.875996
  (lagged) [0.765011] [0.694971] [0.664877] [0.662818] [0.777924] [0.710779] [0.682764] [0.676290] [0.665385] [0.648485] [0.630783] [0.605661]
Exchange rate regime -0.253832*** -0.275641*** -0.275167*** -0.326642*** -0.263040*** -0.277043*** -0.257642*** -0.322284*** -0.180563** -0.235001*** -0.220494*** -0.234633***
  (lagged) [0.082884] [0.076005] [0.075512] [0.077199] [0.085151] [0.079016] [0.078007] [0.079055] [0.077546] [0.074620] [0.073190] [0.070045]
Current account (% GDP) 3.871623** 3.762727** 4.054381*** 4.027490*** 3.237894* 3.138975** 4.142291*** 3.818239** 1.336182 0.870991 3.230470** 2.368751*
  (lagged) [1.631237] [1.498053] [1.476199] [1.498593] [1.671660] [1.546636] [1.520699] [1.527479] [1.545924] [1.459178] [1.450698] [1.400954]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011539 0.009716 0.012979 0.017686 0.009153 0.008663 0.008247 0.019311 0.012656 0.010732 0.012242 0.011604
  (lagged) [0.016774] [0.015659] [0.015453] [0.015805] [0.017172] [0.016232] [0.015829] [0.016122] [0.016220] [0.015784] [0.015356] [0.014711]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.346529* 0.324778* 0.191851 0.217016 0.33123 0.288967 0.144129 0.215845 0.057303 -0.128712 -0.175233 -0.070256
  (lagged) [0.194985] [0.174998] [0.181551] [0.185812] [0.202540] [0.185758] [0.194701] [0.193477] [0.195895] [0.187925] [0.188197] [0.179156]
Openness
Trade openness 0.211926 0.20239 0.242530* 0.15845 0.199071 0.184656 0.223301 0.120153 0.265702* 0.407616*** 0.332790*** 0.244995*
  (lagged) [0.147086] [0.131286] [0.136209] [0.141728] [0.155608] [0.141598] [0.148335] [0.150706] [0.138863] [0.123264] [0.128791] [0.125631]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** 0.000077*** 0.000081*** 0.000077*** 0.000071** 0.000071*** 0.000081*** 0.000094*** 0.000046 0.000056** 0.000044 0.000059**
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000024] [0.000025] [0.000026] [0.000029] [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000026] [0.000030] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000026]
Net financial inflows 11.514662*** 10.391648*** 10.262464*** 11.271667*** 11.255769*** 10.129376*** 10.659084*** 11.525602*** 7.671799*** 6.315680*** 8.110945*** 8.215188***
  (lagged) [1.683985] [1.492670] [1.467790] [1.559639] [1.695201] [1.517984] [1.513414] [1.587130] [1.457843] [1.323531] [1.351573] [1.327462]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.551115 -1.792917 -1.975086* -0.599935 -1.497787 -1.527451 -2.017934* -0.954859 -1.382518 -2.256069** -2.462574** -1.219842
  (lagged) [1.180732] [1.126365] [1.085373] [1.042269] [1.193473] [1.140541] [1.100192] [1.051842] [1.066548] [1.093576] [1.064852] [0.998431]
World interest rate 3.373916 3.038338 4.498468 2.107685 3.563186 3.382444 4.495374 2.4327 7.492572** 6.245000* 3.268626 5.061969*
  (lagged) [3.472933] [3.287565] [3.184016] [3.227511] [3.538123] [3.368996] [3.256404] [3.276746] [3.276418] [3.219932] [3.119823] [3.018015]
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
1/ The dependent variable, Sudden stop (SS), is defined as the fall in financial account of one standard deviation below the mean and that exceeds 5 percent of GDP. We define this binary variable using different definitions: a) FA0 is the sum of net flows of foreign direct
investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and other investment (OI); b) FA1 adds the net flows in financial derivatives to FA0; and; c) FA2 is the sum of FA1 and net errors and omissions (to capture capital flight). 2/ We normalized the financial account balance
with trend GDP as measured by: band-pass filtered trend GDP, Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend GDP, 3-year moving average GDP, and the lagged GDP.




Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sensitivity to Changes in the Sample of Countries
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is a reversal in the financial account (FA)
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop Sudden stop
All Industrial Developing Middle-Income All Industrial Developing Middle-Income All Industrial Developing Middle-Income
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
FA Definition   1/ FA0 FA0 FA0 FA0 FA1 FA1 FA1 FA1 FA2 FA2 FA2 FA2
GDP growth -3.822197** -2.926604 -4.012013** -3.896723** -3.160636* 1.008407 -3.944089** -3.833840** -1.381005 1.666542 -1.813822 -2.010044
  (lagged) [1.672780] [6.054658] [1.744247] [1.834128] [1.690730] [6.281025] [1.742577] [1.831625] [1.535878] [6.021341] [1.569841] [1.626273]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.459701 1.595238 -0.510651 -0.988552 -0.478296 0.372941 -0.540018 -1.029453 0.836973 -3.70697 0.787344 0.609519
  (lagged) [0.772164] [3.275684] [0.776934] [0.815765] [0.784858] [3.396259] [0.778113] [0.817344] [0.670294] [3.702998] [0.672053] [0.682410]
High Inflation 0.421645 ..    0.467104 0.933541 0.442615 ..    0.49717 0.975384 -0.855022 -0.808396 -0.632298
  (lagged) [0.765011] [0.767915] [0.804657] [0.777924] [0.769268] [0.806473] [0.665385] [0.665671] [0.675665]
Exchange rate regime -0.253832*** -0.144713 -0.240949*** -0.242725*** -0.263040*** -0.181718 -0.237416** -0.238355** -0.180563** -0.062588 -0.178797** -0.155847*
  (lagged) [0.082884] [0.218543] [0.092593] [0.094190] [0.085151] [0.257572] [0.092464] [0.094023] [0.077546] [0.283071] [0.085541] [0.086478]
Current account (% GDP) 3.871623** 35.594296*** -0.200089 -1.778898 3.237894* 27.630163*** -0.200525 -1.802177 1.336182 5.245617 0.292538 -0.669513
  (lagged) [1.631237] [5.952476] [1.738752] [1.857905] [1.671660] [5.937976] [1.734836] [1.858189] [1.545924] [5.356064] [1.609580] [1.680351]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011539 0.025859 0.002195 -0.00169 0.009153 0.009096 0.004774 0.001012 0.012656 -0.008862 0.010948 0.012897
  (lagged) [0.016774] [0.035133] [0.019550] [0.020714] [0.017172] [0.035685] [0.019431] [0.020731] [0.016220] [0.036951] [0.017690] [0.019515]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.346529* 0.64136 0.700020** 0.670846** 0.33123 0.630323 0.725283** 0.693103** 0.057303 0.021891 0.467418 0.327827
  (lagged) [0.194985] [0.393403] [0.337077] [0.327179] [0.202540] [0.436806] [0.335439] [0.326234] [0.195895] [0.549968] [0.296379] [0.303510]
Openness
Trade openness 0.211926 0.672466 0.016579 -0.18678 0.199071 0.630783 0.006431 -0.203329 0.265702* 0.373251 0.183079 0.116968
  (lagged) [0.147086] [0.514180] [0.171654] [0.200862] [0.155608] [0.653497] [0.171348] [0.201063] [0.138863] [0.770371] [0.156337] [0.179426]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** -0.000023 0.000087 0.000233*** 0.000071** -0.00001 0.000099 0.000252*** 0.000046 0.000017 0.000143*** 0.000290***
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000042] [0.000067] [0.000085] [0.000029] [0.000048] [0.000065] [0.000084] [0.000030] [0.000081] [0.000054] [0.000073]
Net financial inflows 11.514662*** 39.582219*** 8.097300*** 7.929226*** 11.255769*** 32.040069*** 8.205475*** 8.067503*** 7.671799*** 14.085213*** 6.651763*** 6.690233***
  (lagged) [1.683985] [5.870140] [1.645713] [1.627779] [1.695201] [5.652294] [1.652173] [1.631806] [1.457843] [5.282049] [1.475913] [1.483442]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.551115 2.711813 -1.311845 -1.305965 -1.497787 3.856053 -1.521719 -1.538609 -1.382518 -7.177903 -1.187329 -1.545317
  (lagged) [1.180732] [3.996409] [1.250107] [1.300714] [1.193473] [4.134423] [1.243830] [1.295775] [1.066548] [5.235283] [1.081640] [1.128691]
World interest rate 3.373916 12.088042 -0.043944 -1.208492 3.563186 15.607715 0.223126 -0.9582 7.492572** 27.920689*** 4.749382 4.621565
  (lagged) [3.472933] [9.777152] [3.881435] [4.044463] [3.538123] [10.520075] [3.873441] [4.040780] [3.276418] [10.674045] [3.596134] [3.730937]
Observations 1530 548 982 882 1530 548 982 882 1530 548 982 882
Countries 82 22 60 52 82 22 60 52 82 22 60 52
1/ The dependent variable, Sudden stop (SS), is defined as the fall in financial account of one standard deviation below the mean and that exceeds 5 percent of GDP. We define this binary variable using different definitions: a) FA0 is the sum of net flows of
foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and other investment (OI); b) FA1 adds the net flows in financial derivatives to FA0; and; c) FA2 is the sum of FA1 and net errors and omissions (to capture capital flight). We normalized the
financial account balance with trend GDP as measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend GDP.  





Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sources of Sudden Stops
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop, Inflow-driven and Outflow-driven Sudden stops      1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 1 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 2 (as % of HP trend GDP)
Variable Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS
GDP growth -3.822197** -3.194174* -1.644741 -5.282655 -3.160636* -2.69008 -1.715502 -3.157332 -1.381005 -0.694057 -3.494 0.929711
  (lagged) [1.672780] [1.762863] [3.809370] [3.698227] [1.690730] [1.782787] [3.834352] [3.780627] [1.535878] [1.810723] [2.639110] [2.524365]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.459701 -0.848292 -11.331409** 0.651832 -0.478296 -0.786433 -12.604114** 0.521112 0.836973 -0.765472 -0.448774 3.024359***
  (lagged) [0.772164] [0.836200] [5.393695] [1.511053] [0.784858] [0.838727] [5.624943] [1.656953] [0.670294] [0.905018] [1.318568] [0.987269]
High Inflation 0.421645 0.819162 1.098147 -10.19364 0.442615 0.760724 2.400702 -10.41468 -0.855022 0.748304 0.412656 -11.951512
  (lagged) [0.765011] [0.828951] [41272.137187] [48049.710350] [0.777924] [0.831817] [39013.061820] [88438.905427] [0.665385] [0.898791] [1.309089] [31557.821021]
Exchange rate regime -0.253832*** -0.257330*** -0.043936 -0.205753 -0.263040*** -0.266375*** -0.07314 -0.210555 -0.180563** -0.217270** -0.004719 -0.130614
  (lagged) [0.082884] [0.086397] [0.186836] [0.185304] [0.085151] [0.087517] [0.189238] [0.202405] [0.077546] [0.091877] [0.123174] [0.131730]
Current account (% GDP) 3.871623** 1.218952 8.100332*** 0.949917 3.237894* 0.665233 8.185806*** -1.251168 1.336182 1.588266 0.743894 -1.07427
  (lagged) [1.631237] [1.696649] [2.944625] [3.220459] [1.671660] [1.735483] [2.968507] [3.598607] [1.545924] [1.801921] [2.321492] [2.485754]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011539 0.022697 -0.014444 0.000127 0.009153 0.017608 0.001812 -0.018156 0.012656 0.004404 0.018298 0.01247
  (lagged) [0.016774] [0.017923] [0.032980] [0.036599] [0.017172] [0.018194] [0.032147] [0.039470] [0.016220] [0.018860] [0.025137] [0.026943]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.346529* -0.058315 0.542155* 0.094378 0.33123 -0.051215 0.480409 -0.225747 0.057303 -0.1268 0.118058 0.048281
  (lagged) [0.194985] [0.213634] [0.303364] [0.463594] [0.202540] [0.222553] [0.305286] [0.576922] [0.195895] [0.230158] [0.267119] [0.360639]
Openness
Trade openness 0.211926 0.157673 0.18939 -0.140507 0.199071 0.117633 0.147545 -0.138841 0.265702* 0.190319 0.226503 0.158589
  (lagged) [0.147086] [0.150536] [0.237700] [0.413994] [0.155608] [0.156430] [0.244336] [0.466060] [0.138863] [0.154871] [0.195192] [0.241290]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** 0.000068** 0.000029 0.00007 0.000071** 0.000082*** 0.000013 0.000028 0.000046 0.000035 0.000032 -0.000001
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000028] [0.000040] [0.000055] [0.000029] [0.000028] [0.000042] [0.000134] [0.000030] [0.000040] [0.000035] [0.000081]
Net financial inflows 11.514662*** 8.886543*** 9.282752*** 8.413532*** 11.255769*** 8.899942*** 9.199984*** 7.891753*** 7.671799*** 7.611399*** 2.253455 5.291458***
  (lagged) [1.683985] [1.570418] [2.658960] [2.737203] [1.695201] [1.631622] [2.642382] [2.894455] [1.457843] [1.621137] [1.917222] [1.974629]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.551115 -1.444716 1.632193 -0.715036 -1.497787 -1.247865 0.820146 -0.49951 -1.382518 -2.096275 -1.746434 1.739161
  (lagged) [1.180732] [1.322739] [2.503504] [2.003004] [1.193473] [1.333567] [2.568505] [2.151096] [1.066548] [1.369071] [1.815621] [1.660046]
World interest rate 3.373916 6.238503* 3.964875 -5.850187 3.563186 6.673806* 2.475066 -4.949341 7.492572** 6.18312 3.397304 10.506088*
  (lagged) [3.472933] [3.727968] [7.620485] [7.644508] [3.538123] [3.776364] [7.648369] [8.148504] [3.276418] [3.937753] [5.350265] [5.479747]
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
1/ The dependent variable, Sudden stop (SS), is defined as the fall in financial account of 1 standard deviation below the mean and that exceeds 5 percent of GDP. We define this binary variable using different definitions: a) FA0 is the sum of net flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment
(PI) and other investment (OI); b) FA1 adds the net flows in financial derivatives to FA0; and; c) FA2 is the sum of FA1 and net errors and omissions (to capture capital flight). We normalized the financial account balance with trend GDP as measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend GDP. On the other hand, we 
use the criteria established by Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco and Neilson (2008) to identify inflow-driven sudden stops, outflow-driven sudden stops, and mixed cases. Their criteria relies on the contribution of inflows to the reversal in the financial account. If the fall in the financial account is mostly explained by the
decline in inflows (ratio of changes in gross inflows to the change in financial account greater than 0.75), we classify this event as an inflow-driven sudden stop. If mostly explained by an increase in outflows (ratio lower than 0.25), then we denote this episode as an outflow-driven sudden stop. The rest of the episodes





Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sources of Sudden Stops, Regression analysis by sample of countries
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop, Inflow-driven and Outflow-driven Sudden stops      1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)
                   INDUSTRIAL Countries                   DEVELOPING Countries         MIDDLE-INCOME Countries
Variable Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS
GDP growth -2.926604 -15.782319** 6.693452 1.908564 -4.012013** -3.060357 -3.108618 -6.157209 -3.896723** -3.182395 -0.492842 -6.322071
  (lagged) [6.054658] [7.924089] [8.214795] [13.983529] [1.744247] [1.885103] [5.593229] [5.162178] [1.834128] [1.965641] [5.083410] [5.437621]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation 1.595238 0.05736 -8.78084 7.074362 -0.510651 -0.828043 -13.389453 0.084801 -0.988552 -1.32877 -15.868039 0.010565
  (lagged) [3.275684] [4.485250] [8.916256] [5.547148] [0.776934] [0.873645] [8.407456] [2.398182] [0.815765] [0.925318] [10.529196] [2.581867]
High Inflation ..    ..    ..    ..    0.467104 0.79709 3.450151 -14.216067 0.933541 1.283931 5.631571 -11.467439
  (lagged) [0.767915] [0.866316] [4.91209e+05] [1.61062e+07] [0.804657] [0.916014] [1.08343e+06] [1.44012e+05]
Exchange rate regime -0.144713 -0.331968 -0.068444 -1.109020* -0.240949*** -0.233980** -0.009915 -0.279358 -0.242725*** -0.232759** 0.105463 -0.294729
  (lagged) [0.218543] [0.296392] [0.301357] [0.586520] [0.092593] [0.099658] [0.359652] [0.282835] [0.094190] [0.101362] [0.412856] [0.326088]
Current account (% GDP) 35.594296*** 33.276584*** 27.248654*** 19.928303* -0.200089 -1.970911 1.923452 -1.029919 -1.778898 -2.5972 -0.152715 -4.162447
  (lagged) [5.952476] [8.037471] [7.498700] [11.768342] [1.738752] [1.880730] [4.053546] [4.832068] [1.857905] [1.976828] [4.468617] [5.514127]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.025859 0.069108 -0.072513 0.132165 0.002195 0.005436 0.02869 -0.073974 -0.00169 0.001832 0.05163 -0.068966
  (lagged) [0.035133] [0.043363] [0.050863] [0.092286] [0.019550] [0.021517] [0.046698] [0.068332] [0.020714] [0.022410] [0.074423] [0.068966]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.64136 -0.263706 0.922009* 0.064879 0.700020** 0.707384** 0.013453 0.437862 0.670846** 0.685601* -0.207976 0.739604
  (lagged) [0.393403] [0.538192] [0.507109] [0.942263] [0.337077] [0.338380] [0.714458] [1.143199] [0.327179] [0.355069] [0.790810] [1.116683]
Openness
Trade openness 0.672466 0.571517 0.524546 -1.669107 0.016579 -0.137178 0.589613 -0.463828 -0.18678 -0.286235 0.662829 -0.415013
  (lagged) [0.514180] [0.532601] [0.599760] [1.428378] [0.171654] [0.188248] [0.442145] [0.755723] [0.200862] [0.216391] [0.619244] [0.795279]
Natural resource abundance -0.000023 -0.000036 0.00001 0.000098 0.000087 0.000061 0.000101 -0.000026 0.000233*** 0.00013 0.000319 0.000187
  (lagged) [0.000042] [0.000054] [0.000057] [0.000090] [0.000067] [0.000080] [0.000126] [0.000294] [0.000085] [0.000099] [0.000208] [0.000341]
Net financial inflows 39.582219*** 40.374054*** 26.981621*** 38.148714** 8.097300*** 6.562873*** 6.694392** 9.489082** 7.929226*** 6.400758*** 6.206141** 6.999952
  (lagged) [5.870140] [8.030862] [7.179706] [14.877058] [1.645713] [1.604435] [2.985289] [4.131043] [1.627779] [1.651017] [3.162859] [4.285567]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks 2.711813 8.154338 4.128197 -9.953399 -1.311845 -1.244817 -0.067126 0.731562 -1.305965 -1.067088 -2.420546 0.219333
  (lagged) [3.996409] [5.078790] [5.084672] [8.013208] [1.250107] [1.410945] [3.830651] [2.595744] [1.300714] [1.476864] [4.537519] [2.676986]
World interest rate 12.088042 20.538534 7.969904 -14.20535 -0.043944 2.78418 -7.564941 -11.198058 -1.208492 1.346912 -5.454146 -12.102519
  (lagged) [9.777152] [13.061926] [13.856077] [19.816450] [3.881435] [4.201047] [12.426608] [11.700625] [4.044463] [4.324431] [14.363353] [12.573286]
Observations 548 548 548 548 982 982 982 982 882 882 882 882
Countries 22 22 22 22 60 60 60 60 52 52 52 52
1/ See footnote in Table 6.  Standard errors in brackets.  *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level.29 
 
 
   
Table 8
Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sources of Sudden Stops, Different Financial Sector Indicators
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop, Inflow-driven and Outflow-driven Sudden stops      1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)
            Financial account reversal           Inflow-driven suddens stops          Outflow-driven suddens stops
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
GDP growth -3.822197** -3.878204** -3.795488** -3.846455** -3.194174* -3.119650* -3.284323* -3.147281* -1.644741 -2.120711 -2.532079 -1.975272
  (lagged) [1.672780] [1.669261] [1.539088] [1.662599] [1.762863] [1.760322] [1.681084] [1.755789] [3.809370] [3.828299] [3.457496] [3.822104]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.459701 -0.471035 -0.63796 -0.462277 -0.848292 -0.727432 -0.599413 -0.800122 -11.331409** -12.083432** -8.520610** -11.956255**
  (lagged) [0.772164] [0.762304] [0.736536] [0.772114] [0.836200] [0.822233] [0.793121] [0.832482] [5.393695] [5.398732] [4.031231] [5.421610]
High Inflation 0.421645 0.428791 0.543597 0.419362 0.819162 0.697738 0.552649 0.767697 1.098147 1.031968 -1.673449 1.452318
  (lagged) [0.765011] [0.754310] [0.723731] [0.763306] [0.828951] [0.814600] [0.785173] [0.823774] [41272.137187] [72027.480458] [29290.332769] [46346.479757]
Exchange rate regime -0.253832*** -0.272688*** -0.241293*** -0.249421*** -0.257330*** -0.255999*** -0.247052*** -0.251168*** -0.043936 -0.041581 -0.048995 -0.024192
  (lagged) [0.082884] [0.085397] [0.081380] [0.083103] [0.086397] [0.087923] [0.085253] [0.086443] [0.186836] [0.205703] [0.194657] [0.192410]
Current account (% GDP) 3.871623** 3.433361** 4.426292*** 3.749514** 1.218952 1.064151 1.638805 1.185104 8.100332*** 7.925693*** 9.967373*** 8.060058***
  (lagged) [1.631237] [1.662196] [1.540351] [1.636568] [1.696649] [1.750600] [1.627318] [1.718401] [2.944625] [3.036681] [2.979832] [2.990620]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011539 0.016081 0.008859 0.013505 0.022697 0.021892 0.012545 0.021899 -0.014444 -0.01026 -0.017012 -0.012107
  (lagged) [0.016774] [0.016660] [0.017005] [0.016612] [0.017923] [0.017897] [0.018659] [0.017883] [0.032980] [0.033147] [0.033302] [0.033025]
Financial sector
Bank credit (% GDP) 0.346529* ..     ..     ..     -0.058315 ..     ..     ..     0.542155* ..     ..     ..    
  (lagged) [0.194985] [0.213634] [0.303364]
Bank Deposit (% GDP) ..     0.510858** ..     ..     ..     0.055061 ..     ..     ..     0.35136 ..     ..    
  (lagged) [0.243343] [0.264559] [0.381842]
Credit-Deposit ratio ..     ..     0.238419 ..     ..     ..     0.231667 ..     ..     ..     0.261327 ..    
  (lagged) [0.154119] [0.162165] [0.305888]
Bank Assets (% GDP) ..     ..     ..     0.293961 ..     ..     ..     -0.027704 ..     ..     ..     0.346442
  (lagged) [0.182501] [0.199322] [0.287240]
Openness
Trade openness 0.211926 0.166607 0.298056** 0.231372 0.157673 0.151525 0.175718 0.16504 0.18939 0.193205 0.337803 0.242843
  (lagged) [0.147086] [0.153370] [0.140122] [0.146751] [0.150536] [0.156247] [0.145191] [0.151452] [0.237700] [0.266269] [0.244191] [0.241390]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** 0.000075*** 0.000059** 0.000070** 0.000068** 0.000070** 0.000070** 0.000068** 0.000029 0.000025 0.000008 0.000025
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000028] [0.000027] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000029] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000040] [0.000044] [0.000045] [0.000042]
Net financial inflows 11.514662*** 11.658705*** 10.957957*** 11.498343*** 8.886543*** 8.896395*** 9.198420*** 8.862203*** 9.282752*** 9.250452*** 9.852607*** 9.285074***
  (lagged) [1.683985] [1.702213] [1.588013] [1.687234] [1.570418] [1.624820] [1.570128] [1.617398] [2.658960] [2.685699] [2.642884] [2.677457]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.551115 -1.470102 -1.643611 -1.551661 -1.444716 -1.379246 -1.593991 -1.423239 1.632193 1.385114 0.903629 1.447743
  (lagged) [1.180732] [1.183901] [1.108233] [1.178684] [1.322739] [1.338228] [1.278726] [1.329612] [2.503504] [2.533876] [2.411682] [2.519346]
World interest rate 3.373916 3.136222 3.396751 3.060948 6.238503* 5.996523 6.290909* 6.02846 3.964875 3.646947 -1.542228 3.340055
  (lagged) [3.472933] [3.480026] [3.351379] [3.463781] [3.727968] [3.735214] [3.681500] [3.723737] [7.620485] [7.626306] [7.394926] [7.614338]
Observations 1530 1540 1612 1540 1530 1540 1612 1540 1530 1540 1612 1540
Countries 82 82 88 82 82 82 88 82 82 82 88 82




Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sources of Sudden Stops, Different indicators of financial openness
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop, Inflow-driven and Outflow-driven Sudden stops      1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)
            Financial account reversal           Inflow-driven suddens stops          Outflow-driven suddens stops
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
GDP growth -3.822197** -4.002587** -3.773758** -3.830103** -3.194174* -3.222182* -3.194473* -3.394339* -1.644741 -1.839749 -1.695299 -1.408237
  (lagged) [1.672780] [1.680366] [1.668203] [1.675193] [1.762863] [1.781552] [1.765111] [1.798722] [3.809370] [3.808447] [3.827335] [3.896488]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.459701 -0.560626 -0.458387 -0.495944 -0.848292 -0.897189 -0.861939 -0.995603 -11.331409** -11.674114** -11.231172** -11.897072**
  (lagged) [0.772164] [0.775992] [0.770634] [0.772863] [0.836200] [0.839412] [0.837962] [0.848323] [5.393695] [5.604101] [5.377374] [5.812001]
High Inflation 0.421645 0.524113 0.419995 0.457248 0.819162 0.870189 0.831453 0.965119 1.098147 1.664633 1.006172 0.899783
  (lagged) [0.765011] [0.768750] [0.763508] [0.765676] [0.828951] [0.832372] [0.830695] [0.840925] [41272.137187] [25577.692380] [41325.153094] [68879.734026]
Exchange rate regime -0.253832*** -0.248941*** -0.251977*** -0.248041*** -0.257330*** -0.259115*** -0.252798*** -0.246940*** -0.043936 -0.048536 -0.042993 -0.064665
  (lagged) [0.082884] [0.082716] [0.082962] [0.083058] [0.086397] [0.086715] [0.086918] [0.087625] [0.186836] [0.190025] [0.186744] [0.202256]
Current account (% GDP) 3.871623** 4.027623** 3.663352** 3.687443** 1.218952 1.235835 0.983002 0.888147 8.100332*** 8.310991*** 8.031269*** 8.688131***
  (lagged) [1.631237] [1.635011] [1.629664] [1.635340] [1.696649] [1.719629] [1.703955] [1.752256] [2.944625] [3.048170] [2.940996] [3.184270]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011539 0.010972 0.011117 0.010899 0.022697 0.024719 0.021436 0.022583 -0.014444 -0.02061 -0.014534 -0.017338
  (lagged) [0.016774] [0.016684] [0.016837] [0.016836] [0.017923] [0.018084] [0.018063] [0.018232] [0.032980] [0.033462] [0.033063] [0.034669]
Financial sector
Bank credit (% GDP) 0.346529* 0.282835 0.341065* 0.30599 -0.058315 -0.12657 -0.054601 -0.189874 0.542155* 0.570376* 0.537963* 0.641375*
  (lagged) [0.194985] [0.199199] [0.195258] [0.199334] [0.213634] [0.220127] [0.219778] [0.233648] [0.303364] [0.318174] [0.303523] [0.335466]
Openness
Trade openness 0.211926 0.208997 0.195755 0.208698 0.157673 0.208619 0.117902 0.132878 0.18939 0.100597 0.183071 0.130442
  (lagged) [0.147086] [0.149369] [0.152736] [0.153220] [0.150536] [0.154517] [0.162019] [0.164360] [0.237700] [0.255136] [0.244710] [0.270853]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** 0.000061** 0.000069** 0.000071*** 0.000068** 0.000068** 0.000070** 0.000076*** 0.000029 0.000027 0.000029 0.000029
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000029] [0.000028] [0.000040] [0.000041] [0.000040] [0.000044]
Net financial inflows 11.514662*** ..    ..    ..    8.886543*** ..    ..    ..    9.282752*** ..    ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.683985] [1.570418] [2.658960]
Net equity flows ..    ..    11.524384*** ..    ..    ..    9.320573*** ..    ..    ..    9.312854*** ..   
  (lagged) [1.834615] [1.844437] [2.895226]
Net FDI flows ..    10.486533*** ..    10.591698*** ..    7.011741*** ..    6.939068*** ..    11.772510*** ..    13.002860***
  (lagged) [2.133588] [2.109449] [2.103158] [2.138176] [4.020656] [4.418123]
Net FPI flows ..    10.009018*** ..    ..    ..    9.552173*** ..    ..    ..    7.537813** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [2.020698] [2.169330] [3.156474]
Net FPI equity flows ..    ..    ..    12.556559*** ..    ..    ..    12.430677*** ..    ..    ..    7.553050**
  (lagged) [2.192659] [2.385558] [3.358189]
Net debt flows ..    ..    11.139306*** 11.493845*** ..    ..    8.412658*** 9.671462*** ..    ..    9.158622*** 9.347567***
  (lagged) [1.709713] [1.761110] [1.615578] [1.773579] [2.726035] [2.951230]
Net other investment flows ..    12.781019*** ..    ..    ..    9.802556*** ..    ..    ..    9.401370*** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.878481] [1.807140] [2.803307]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.551115 -1.544087 -1.508421 -1.487243 -1.444716 -1.455869 -1.375371 -1.321922 1.632193 1.359779 1.60261 1.334859
  (lagged) [1.180732] [1.181331] [1.176629] [1.178242] [1.322739] [1.334715] [1.319821] [1.337177] [2.503504] [2.516365] [2.521302] [2.654665]
World interest rate 3.373916 3.118711 3.217121 3.06843 6.238503* 6.073842 6.084214 5.756155 3.964875 4.439255 3.767176 4.758251
  (lagged) [3.472933] [3.467676] [3.466712] [3.468259] [3.727968] [3.738240] [3.733006] [3.752432] [7.620485] [7.738922] [7.645273] [8.103443]
Observations 1530 1540 1612 1540 1530 1540 1612 1540 1530 1540 1612 1540
Countries 82 82 88 82 82 82 88 82 82 82 88 82




Determinants of Sudden Stops: Sources of Sudden Stops, Different indicators of financial openness
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop, Inflow-driven and Outflow-driven Sudden stops      1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)
            Financial account reversal           Inflow-driven suddens stops          Outflow-driven suddens stops
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
GDP growth -3.970180** -4.090172** -3.842003** -3.860769** -3.365937* -3.335608* -3.216815* -3.345364* -1.79201 -1.847455 -1.829933 -1.691793
  (lagged) [1.686998] [1.688720] [1.681264] [1.680176] [1.795518] [1.808287] [1.789627] [1.804638] [3.858700] [3.862229] [3.877600] [3.923631]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.469764 -0.54959 -0.463871 -0.505114 -0.887493 -0.920912 -0.875455 -0.973046 -11.326328** -11.614023** -11.317281** -11.721408**
  (lagged) [0.775117] [0.776110] [0.772202] [0.773153] [0.849474] [0.847091] [0.843053] [0.847752] [5.366589] [5.637534] [5.434857] [5.731827]
High Inflation 0.432823 0.513244 0.426398 0.466083 0.85977 0.894722 0.847098 0.942794 1.091753 1.291291 1.085167 1.658601
  (lagged) [0.768070] [0.768884] [0.765173] [0.765899] [0.842488] [0.840119] [0.836028] [0.840360] [43546.870814] [44395.566551] [43599.167888] [25679.417136]
Exchange rate regime -0.241928*** -0.238061*** -0.242927*** -0.240696*** -0.242619*** -0.246822*** -0.246946*** -0.247655*** -0.03722 -0.044123 -0.036346 -0.04422
  (lagged) [0.083643] [0.083166] [0.083303] [0.083051] [0.088181] [0.087812] [0.087693] [0.087849] [0.187161] [0.191260] [0.187423] [0.194420]
Current account (% GDP) 3.843852** 3.899694** 3.542973** 3.597977** 1.053663 1.004837 0.742489 0.699782 8.116018*** 8.293298*** 8.060956*** 8.726345***
  (lagged) [1.641565] [1.644966] [1.645677] [1.644534] [1.738837] [1.755873] [1.739979] [1.766843] [2.930932] [3.032080] [2.935680] [3.074651]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.009029 0.007932 0.008393 0.007413 0.019828 0.021093 0.018915 0.020449 -0.015525 -0.021017 -0.015044 -0.022629
  (lagged) [0.016946] [0.016871] [0.016979] [0.016978] [0.018258] [0.018388] [0.018294] [0.018454] [0.033119] [0.033669] [0.033274] [0.034426]
Financial sector
Bank credit (% GDP) 0.299564 0.22667 0.272343 0.248705 -0.135074 -0.209151 -0.151928 -0.213791 0.527390* 0.559602* 0.520722* 0.560612*
  (lagged) [0.199120] [0.203319] [0.201689] [0.202587] [0.226722] [0.233983] [0.229387] [0.236125] [0.306461] [0.325443] [0.311093] [0.327160]
Openness
Trade openness 0.17809 0.139479 0.146724 0.152332 0.091263 0.120848 0.073533 0.093248 0.183121 0.097453 0.188286 0.101599
  (lagged) [0.151449] [0.156890] [0.156942] [0.157627] [0.162540] [0.166603] [0.166972] [0.169089] [0.236648] [0.271868] [0.256388] [0.270293]
Natural resource abundance 0.000069** 0.000064** 0.000071*** 0.000071*** 0.000070** 0.000072** 0.000073** 0.000079*** 0.000029 0.000027 0.000028 0.000026
  (lagged) [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000027] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000028] [0.000029] [0.000039] [0.000041] [0.000040] [0.000042]
Gross outflows 11.329698*** ..    ..    ..    8.735955*** ..    ..    ..    9.179143*** ..    ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.686451] [1.631931] [2.673676]
Gross equity outflows ..    ..    10.086316*** ..    ..    ..    7.606580*** ..    ..    ..    9.191521*** ..   
  (lagged) [1.973400] [2.001198] [3.317005]
Gross debt outflows ..    ..    11.485048*** 11.914856*** ..    ..    8.860410*** 10.005549*** ..    ..    9.083312*** 9.339383***
  (lagged) [1.730953] [1.809336] [1.673739] [1.851561] [2.732048] [2.900712]
Gross FDI outflows ..    9.338138*** ..    10.792394*** ..    6.201647** ..    6.356720** ..    11.747024*** ..    13.715145***
  (lagged) [2.337109] [2.428060] [2.412595] [2.473204] [4.431450] [4.591920]
Gross FPI outflows ..    9.727862*** ..    ..    ..    9.270331*** ..    ..    ..    7.450211** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [2.012027] [2.150312] [3.189495]
Gross FPI equity outflows ..    ..    ..    7.918636** ..    ..    ..    10.041697** ..    ..    ..    2.764742
  (lagged) [3.626790] [4.293133] [5.289132]
Gross OI outflows ..    12.954606*** ..    ..    ..    9.765638*** ..    ..    ..    9.380743*** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.933060] [1.965538] [2.871934]
Gross inflows 11.712309*** ..    ..    ..    9.325910*** ..    ..    ..    9.289459*** ..    ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.700817] [1.666407] [2.645657]
Gross equity inflows ..    ..    11.380685*** ..    ..    ..    9.010978*** ..    ..    ..    9.208018*** ..   
  (lagged) [1.849099] [1.884961] [2.919654]
Gross debt inflows ..    ..    11.474284*** 11.651051*** ..    ..    9.023299*** 9.695402*** ..    ..    9.233229*** 9.535337***
  (lagged) [1.753009] [1.766293] [1.709786] [1.776768] [2.733165] [2.888510]
Gross FDI inflows ..    10.924021*** ..    10.746239*** ..    7.651995*** ..    7.249101*** ..    11.563626*** ..    12.009471***
  (lagged) [2.141011] [2.112148] [2.172968] [2.159214] [4.149008] [4.242053]
Gross FPI inflows ..    10.079745*** ..    ..    ..    9.701624*** ..    ..    ..    7.679339** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [2.081621] [2.223364] [3.244830]
Gross FPI equity inflows ..    ..    ..    11.519747*** ..    ..    ..    11.851528*** ..    ..    ..    6.400499*
  (lagged) [2.357766] [2.716586] [3.417874]
Gross OI inflows ..    12.812710*** ..    ..    ..    10.134382*** ..    ..    ..    9.298664*** ..    ..   
  (lagged) [1.888662] [1.880558] [2.834728]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -1.519387 -1.474627 -1.422615 -1.38627 -1.400055 -1.396733 -1.308687 -1.258783 1.65399 1.353914 1.63995 1.584755
  (lagged) [1.184570] [1.184011] [1.182109] [1.180074] [1.343650] [1.350490] [1.337435] [1.342894] [2.488900] [2.504355] [2.519881] [2.551032]
World interest rate 3.489663 3.029092 3.15839 2.99325 6.452192* 6.228604 6.148262 5.685054 4.057373 4.297405 4.016776 5.074259
  (lagged) [3.491326] [3.483434] [3.490466] [3.488304] [3.787220] [3.789551] [3.774827] [3.780695] [7.603531] [7.766554] [7.732130] [8.027299]
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82




Determinants of Sudden Stops, Net and By Sources: Exchange rate regimes as buffers?
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is a reversal in the financial account (FA)    1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 1 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 2 (as % of HP trend GDP)
Variable Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS
GDP growth -3.944083** -3.219383* -1.479474 -5.803859 -3.277871* -2.710865 -1.56544 -3.731247 -1.354607 -0.603149 -3.332134 0.915896
  (lagged) [1.680243] [1.775127] [3.860220] [3.602909] [1.699679] [1.792079] [3.912062] [3.748689] [1.534391] [1.813485] [2.655626] [2.528813]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.524547 -0.915901 -11.525410** 0.616469 -0.556042 -0.841462 -13.012775** 0.447506 0.921495 -0.686331 -0.412887 3.140592***
  (lagged) [0.779407] [0.845539] [5.461602] [1.480236] [0.793581] [0.847442] [5.747777] [1.633054] [0.674361] [0.908998] [1.312218] [1.002497]
High Inflation 0.483439 0.885521 1.607508 -9.758193 0.5173 0.814796 2.584895 -9.701151 -0.9396 0.671496 0.369072 -12.433615
  (lagged) [0.771752] [0.838071] [24594.875751] [47904.413974] [0.786114] [0.840277] [39407.343668] [51934.591050] [0.669424] [0.902988] [1.301415] [38083.447772]
Exchange rate regime -0.331589** -0.330033** -0.193518 -0.228117 -0.351642** -0.325649** -0.28654 -0.270038 -0.079287 -0.097416 -0.074216 0.040264
  XRR  (lagged) [0.138540] [0.153196] [0.295690] [0.263411] [0.142330] [0.155653] [0.298098] [0.295628] [0.136260] [0.165728] [0.213898] [0.235251]
Current account (% GDP) 3.784615** 1.174912 7.981150*** 0.344757 3.150072* 0.629295 8.164124*** -1.788978 1.369893 1.680376 0.448477 -0.971074
  (lagged) [1.638699] [1.707063] [2.980339] [3.204629] [1.679496] [1.739856] [3.019558] [3.546863] [1.552371] [1.808609] [2.324623] [2.526445]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.011607 0.022476 -0.01403 0.002167 0.009059 0.017426 0.001361 -0.015685 0.01247 0.004064 0.018051 0.012954
  (lagged) [0.016760] [0.017966] [0.033035] [0.035871] [0.017172] [0.018211] [0.032407] [0.038789] [0.016239] [0.018967] [0.025153] [0.027425]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.341178* -0.076241 0.532788* 0.141715 0.322759 -0.065721 0.4557 -0.182085 0.083838 -0.102956 0.131425 0.075706
  (lagged) [0.196470] [0.219942] [0.310717] [0.444601] [0.204221] [0.224657] [0.314819] [0.554243] [0.196227] [0.231640] [0.269795] [0.364418]
Openness
Trade openness 0.216452 0.16166 0.187028 -0.081717 0.20477 0.121527 0.143527 -0.085517 0.268225* 0.187085 0.231731 0.153055
  (lagged) [0.147836] [0.152482] [0.241456] [0.390090] [0.156531] [0.157185] [0.249479] [0.440536] [0.138296] [0.154847] [0.195145] [0.244590]
Natural resource abundance 0.000073*** 0.000066** 0.000031 0.000074 0.000075** 0.000080*** 0.000013 0.000011 0.000048 0.000034 0.000041 0.000002
  (lagged) [0.000028] [0.000029] [0.000042] [0.000058] [0.000030] [0.000029] [0.000044] [0.000135] [0.000030] [0.000040] [0.000036] [0.000079]
Net financial inflows 11.513456*** 8.892816*** 9.299308*** 7.972332*** 11.255068*** 8.903173*** 9.343336*** 7.452961*** 7.711340*** 7.680260*** 2.227546 5.399529***
  (lagged) [1.684216] [1.616451] [2.689405] [2.581304] [1.696325] [1.631448] [2.698416] [2.716128] [1.463769] [1.630255] [1.886817] [2.007175]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -0.632956 -2.506021 2.296093 3.635393 -0.813809 -2.168825 0.250653 3.94748 0.304192 -2.0435 1.108825 2.522203
  Dlpx  (lagged) [2.208142] [2.417486] [5.539792] [3.470114] [2.221101] [2.415657] [6.327995] [3.771399] [1.962394] [2.774447] [3.114885] [3.108702]
World interest rate -1.446455 1.529792 -8.85103 -9.175427 -1.978979 2.852097 -15.44755 -10.32445 14.274905* 13.413967 -0.589064 20.687321
  Wir (lagged) [8.075521] [8.552367] [20.020011] [17.197232] [8.229447] [8.651747] [20.268709] [18.389002] [7.863236] [9.469598] [13.344639] [13.058592]
Dlpx * XRR -0.604492 0.676799 -0.358463 -2.579267 -0.464507 0.594023 0.370838 -2.654888 -1.040095 0.013988 -1.784663 -0.474708
  (lagged) [1.167837] [1.350030] [2.886429] [1.786682] [1.178791] [1.355656] [3.192592] [1.924842] [1.059488] [1.422263] [1.628254] [1.750402]
Wir * XRR 2.926723 2.814845 7.134454 1.763524 3.365566 2.282238 10.077143 3.072106 -3.925452 -4.347913 2.090342 -5.947968
  (lagged) [4.360237] [4.661024] [10.250066] [9.090254] [4.465385] [4.715665] [10.417465] [9.992610] [4.159010] [5.135230] [6.605951] [6.910729]
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82




Determinants of Sudden Stops, Net and By Sources: Does dollarization amplifies external shocks?
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is a reversal in the financial account (FA)   1/
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 1 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 2 (as % of HP trend GDP)
Variable Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS
GDP growth -4.105463** -3.098136* -2.294082 -7.302590* -3.683957** -2.83525 -2.722617 -4.724446 -0.669054 -0.574323 -2.501964 1.018801
  (lagged) [1.773547] [1.843837] [4.539607] [4.222450] [1.768613] [1.845900] [4.513304] [4.048172] [1.547995] [1.859969] [2.832084] [2.582716]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.640466 -0.862353 -10.272139* -0.467507 -0.701103 -0.808787 -11.817529** -0.833857 0.718703 -0.790644 -0.945554 2.742643***
  (lagged) [0.814467] [0.863369] [5.462215] [1.861907] [0.815040] [0.858940] [5.731883] [1.945559] [0.674239] [0.924916] [1.482871] [1.025303]
High Inflation 0.620477 0.844494 -1.807571 -9.678983 0.679122 0.79211 -1.076854 -9.572362 -0.728326 0.780248 0.917806 -14.246057
  (lagged) [0.808021] [0.857093] [50404.126231] [41029.729101] [0.808179] [0.853017] [81414.593816] [36978.274675] [0.669619] [0.919889] [1.473285] [1.05565e+06]
Exchange rate regime -0.223917** -0.215053** 0.123998 -0.295815 -0.242362*** -0.220157** 0.065373 -0.37875 -0.155664* -0.198942** 0.170289 -0.139331
  XRR  (lagged) [0.090698] [0.092347] [0.232146] [0.234525] [0.090736] [0.092443] [0.228518] [0.242146] [0.079449] [0.097752] [0.148989] [0.136585]
Current account (% GDP) 3.527302** 1.356447 7.538613** 0.401589 3.087831* 0.993741 7.753444** -1.115287 2.109646 2.248384 2.338981 -1.093942
  (lagged) [1.794442] [1.850067] [3.466887] [3.554689] [1.799281] [1.854106] [3.476629] [3.822549] [1.608888] [1.931908] [2.566095] [2.558091]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.008693 0.024185 -0.041216 0.016364 0.00896 0.021491 -0.016418 -0.004334 0.013181 0.011185 0.013298 0.00834
  (lagged) [0.018652] [0.019520] [0.039674] [0.044896] [0.018679] [0.019558] [0.037354] [0.046514] [0.016810] [0.020445] [0.027733] [0.028368]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.509362** 0.105453 0.563011 0.049667 0.486480** 0.102508 0.447924 -0.171339 0.161371 0.05848 0.047924 0.114496
  (lagged) [0.224271] [0.242853] [0.382094] [0.592535] [0.222933] [0.242888] [0.372784] [0.663485] [0.204352] [0.244169] [0.311507] [0.377804]
Openness
Trade openness 0.09379 0.018166 0.225604 -0.057282 0.092512 0.015484 0.168156 -0.093168 0.189898 0.097932 0.26246 0.079601
  (lagged) [0.167355] [0.173421] [0.274024] [0.477739] [0.167282] [0.173474] [0.279593] [0.488935] [0.139192] [0.171651] [0.207402] [0.268441]
Natural resource abundance 0.000060** 0.000065** 0.000017 0.00007 0.000051* 0.000070** -0.000009 0.000004 0.000023 0.000009 0.000007 -0.000001
  (lagged) [0.000030] [0.000030] [0.000048] [0.000057] [0.000031] [0.000030] [0.000050] [0.000153] [0.000030] [0.000049] [0.000036] [0.000079]
Net financial inflows 11.724833*** 9.076686*** 9.146738*** 8.790575*** 11.242085*** 8.854313*** 8.903630*** 8.242288*** 7.515712*** 7.987984*** 2.620011 4.577180**
  (lagged) [1.809798] [1.737000] [2.988105] [3.047220] [1.779827] [1.724181] [2.943198] [2.982005] [1.476020] [1.699251] [1.954507] [1.944354]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -0.798983 -2.424298 5.502171 1.202722 -0.617949 -2.242524 5.245245 2.088624 0.713338 -1.949196 2.685222 3.07598
  Dlpx  (lagged) [1.863271] [2.192080] [3.696024] [2.891554] [1.862446] [2.190841] [3.824747] [3.109869] [1.560524] [2.415677] [2.325969] [2.072661]
World interest rate 2.227106 5.364446 3.343591 -12.002881 1.907471 5.105734 2.323278 -9.933149 5.591029 4.650091 -0.905048 10.573446*
  Wir (lagged) [4.606560] [4.693445] [10.264146] [12.310788] [4.617658] [4.702236] [10.281145] [12.228390] [4.034766] [5.031449] [7.213393] [6.314621]
Dlpx * Deposit dollarization 2.606771 5.53706 -16.817386 6.043213 1.683128 5.26584 -20.957829 2.555679 -5.604813 4.898241 -20.227667** -9.737188
  (lagged) [5.649015] [6.217231] [16.286698] [10.435750] [5.621994] [6.199598] [16.865806] [10.473745] [5.146117] [6.720975] [8.435600] [8.326228]
Wir * Deposit dollarization 3.809006 2.745913 2.409488 13.50189 3.238859 3.594001 -0.863511 8.213759 7.505707 9.75905 14.248259 -11.237052
  (lagged) [10.586144] [10.002008] [22.338979] [24.851447] [10.622236] [9.918849] [23.851485] [25.478596] [8.430062] [9.704444] [14.216027] [15.711862]
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66





Determinants of Sudden Stops, Net and By Sources: Does openness mitigates the impact of external shocks?
Dependent variable: Sudden Stop dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is a reversal in the financial account (FA)
Sample of ALL Countries (82 countries), 1975-2007 (annual information)
                             Financial account FA 0 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 1 (as % of HP trend GDP)                              Financial account FA 2 (as % of HP trend GDP)
Variable Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS Sudden stop Inflow-driven SS Outflow-driven SS Mixed case SS
GDP growth -3.898886** -3.282330* -1.963326 -4.874469 -3.214268* -2.74563 -2.117028 -2.757849 -1.378223 -0.603993 -3.56051 0.699648
  (lagged) [1.702961] [1.807558] [3.993309] [3.667262] [1.718070] [1.818971] [4.030370] [3.565311] [1.533779] [1.802046] [2.668108] [2.607225]
Macroeconomic framework
Inflation -0.632787 -1.04602 -12.614376** 0.545661 -0.651204 -0.954517 -13.835623** 0.501664 0.814737 -0.915156 -0.447983 3.147700***
  (lagged) [0.785511] [0.860684] [5.734968] [1.552235] [0.797840] [0.859707] [5.904700] [1.605313] [0.672313] [0.928497] [1.322726] [1.005433]
High Inflation 0.593552 1.014176 2.11559 -9.880469 0.615521 0.926766 3.45331 -9.113268 -0.831629 0.898939 0.408455 -12.972914
  (lagged) [0.778187] [0.852833] [40124.556647] [38130.386908] [0.790834] [0.852363] [38656.602825] [17236.441210] [0.667608] [0.922669] [1.312687] [2.59357e+05]
Exchange rate regime -0.255271*** -0.267410*** -0.045791 -0.25311 -0.264001*** -0.275741*** -0.075306 -0.246877 -0.178218** -0.222228** -0.002854 -0.090967
  XRR  (lagged) [0.082975] [0.087624] [0.197290] [0.190294] [0.085178] [0.088481] [0.198395] [0.199448] [0.077637] [0.092585] [0.124466] [0.135199]
Current account (% GDP) 3.856343** 1.219794 11.762260*** 3.205347 3.148400* 0.68033 11.939910*** 0.697441 1.195514 1.165491 0.61089 -1.219829
  (lagged) [1.653035] [1.729390] [3.600996] [3.421328] [1.693821] [1.755917] [3.597366] [3.591747] [1.563255] [1.802046] [2.395509] [2.882272]
CG Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.015764 0.02619 -0.00763 -0.002713 0.013386 0.02087 0.009172 -0.017369 0.013246 0.006727 0.018148 0.021304
  (lagged) [0.017006] [0.018292] [0.035265] [0.037696] [0.017343] [0.018491] [0.034846] [0.038876] [0.016270] [0.019142] [0.025404] [0.028021]
Financial sector
Private credit (% GDP) 0.292744 -0.116906 0.611664* 0.130434 0.28037 -0.105457 0.554292* -0.213498 0.051886 -0.132712 0.109529 0.116804
  (lagged) [0.195904] [0.217996] [0.326794] [0.476350] [0.202419] [0.222344] [0.327642] [0.553905] [0.196789] [0.234270] [0.269631] [0.356048]
Openness
Trade openness 0.324829* 0.379287** 0.08521 -0.272409 0.305013* 0.338729* 0.032303 -0.171984 0.296916 0.349104 0.280698 -0.567633
  (lagged) [0.177038] [0.193308] [0.299224] [0.557868] [0.184339] [0.205225] [0.300353] [0.573439] [0.192405] [0.219065] [0.257179] [0.489329]
Natural resource abundance 0.000070** 0.000072** 0.000033 0.000083 0.000069** 0.000085*** 0.000017 0.000019 0.000043 0.000032 0.000032 -0.000017
  (lagged) [0.000028] [0.000029] [0.000043] [0.000059] [0.000029] [0.000029] [0.000044] [0.000134] [0.000030] [0.000041] [0.000036] [0.000086]
Net financial inflows 9.098374*** 7.164927*** 9.861616*** 10.015104** 8.749632*** 7.269677*** 9.667450*** 7.988223* 7.045959*** 6.707789*** 2.172348 3.747966
  (lagged) [1.978239] [1.977337] [3.579888] [4.428723] [2.015157] [2.032804] [3.540317] [4.411064] [1.962000] [2.100010] [2.633239] [3.408993]
External shocks
Terms of trade shocks -0.790599 0.872152 3.716663 -7.802926* -0.929926 0.881282 2.931185 -8.898976* -1.716981 -6.078054** -0.472605 4.69129
  Dlpx  (lagged) [2.573254] [2.927378] [6.738119] [4.653456] [2.620182] [2.944225] [7.042511] [4.657860] [2.221610] [2.708917] [3.940670] [3.886491]
World interest rate 4.019319 11.127535 -2.053556 -12.906614 3.755698 11.242031 -4.195255 -11.930653 7.647297 9.648995 5.758564 -12.008166
  Wir (lagged) [6.616682] [7.212158] [14.514749] [15.987681] [6.728673] [7.334494] [14.532217] [16.726934] [6.252692] [7.744753] [9.319467] [11.668174]
Dlpx * Trade openness -1.707329 -4.031204 -4.762272 8.92476 -1.229887 -3.799778 -5.053191 12.51103 0.75201 6.215377* -1.899403 -5.409909
  (lagged) [3.757354] [4.224214] [8.394236] [7.508529] [3.853998] [4.272096] [8.762216] [7.649458] [3.302075] [3.769651] [5.646798] [6.115139]
Dlpx * Financial openness 12.012626 10.466486 33.475238 31.887941 6.948144 10.75183 35.954636* 13.523994 -5.84981 4.061115 -1.927623 10.11528
  (lagged) [18.049577] [16.657305] [20.640908] [28.355017] [18.712185] [16.432263] [21.294878] [24.828988] [15.045371] [14.722395] [13.416599] [18.695268]
Wir * Trade openness -6.963105 -10.654138 2.127108 0.342405 -6.663981 -10.026399 2.511149 -3.485803 -1.478348 -7.440853 -3.026147 25.585059*
  (lagged) [6.317417] [6.817018] [11.236489] [19.600315] [6.447638] [7.113335] [11.269579] [19.883665] [6.299529] [7.388259] [9.384027] [13.357823]
Wir * Financial openness 127.279798** 89.217819 199.893651* 112.463088 129.270844** 80.208273 218.644197* 149.903632 25.664744 46.135989 -3.984636 86.351905
  (lagged) [62.335622] [67.829384] [121.395491] [149.144448] [63.305920] [69.304275] [122.702554] [155.084020] [57.553768] [73.056013] [81.480598] [99.793874]
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82























10 Developing Countries36 
 
 
   
Figure 2













































































































































































































































































Sources of Financial Account Reversals





































































































































































Frequency of Sudden Stop Episodes over time


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Outflow-Driven Sudden Stops39 
 
Figure 5
Consequences of sudden stops, by source
Behavior of output per capita, capital per capita and TFP growth
5.1a Real GDP per capita, ALL Countries 5.1b Real GDP per capita, Industrial Countries 5.1c Real GDP per capita, Developing Countries
5.2a Capital stock per capita, ALL Countries 5.2b Capital stock per capita, Industrial Countries 5.2c Capital stock per capita, Developing Countries
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Figure 6
Consequences of sudden stops, by source
Behavior of growth in real GDP, consumption and investment
6.1a Real GDP, ALL Countries 6.1b Real GDP, Industrial Countries 6.1c Real GDP, Developing Countries
6.2a Real Consumption, ALL Countries 6.2b Real Consumption, Industrial Countries 6.2c Real Consumption, Developing Countries
6.3a Real Investment, ALL Countries 6.3b Real Investment, Industrial Countries 6.3c Real Investment, Developing Countries
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Consequences of sudden stops, by source
Behavior of financial development indicators
7.1a Private Credit, ALL Countries 7.1b Private Credit, Industrial Countries 7.1c Private Credit, Developing Countries
7.2a Leverage, ALL Countries 7.2b Leverage, Industrial Countries 7.2c Leverage, Developing Countries
7.3a Bank Assets, ALL Countries 7.3b Bank Assets, Industrial Countries 7.3c Bank Assets, Developing Countries
7.4a Stock market capitalization, ALL Countries 7.4b Stock market capitalization, Industrial Countries 7.4c Stock market capitalization, Developing Countries
7.5a Private bond market capitalization, ALL Countries 7.5b Private bond market capitalization, Industrial Countries 7.5c Private bond market capitalization, Developing Countries
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